Wife’s convenience alone does not warrant matrimonial transfer absent substantial hardship under Section 24 CPC.

The applicant-wife sought transfer of Divorce Case No. 414 of 2025, instituted by the opposite party under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Kanpur Nagar, to the Principal Judge, Family Court, Hamirpur.

The parties were married on 26 February 2009 and had two children.

The applicant alleged that, due to matrimonial discord, she was compelled to leave the matrimonial home with her minor son and was residing at her parental house in Hamirpur.

She had instituted proceedings at Hamirpur under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

She contended that attending proceedings at Kanpur Nagar, more than 60 kilometres away, would cause substantial inconvenience and that she apprehended harm from the opposite party and his family.

The opposite party opposed the transfer, asserting that the applicant was actually residing at Pukhrayan, District Kanpur Dehat, near Kanpur Nagar, and also claiming apprehension of threat to his own safety at Hamirpur.

Whether, in the circumstances of the case, the divorce proceedings pending before the Family Court, Kanpur Nagar, ought to be transferred to the Family Court, Hamirpur under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?

Whether the applicant’s asserted residence at Hamirpur, the pendency of connected proceedings there, the alleged travel inconvenience, and her apprehension regarding personal safety cumulatively established sufficient hardship or prejudice warranting transfer?

The Court applied Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, under which the power to transfer proceedings is discretionary and must be exercised judicially to advance the cause of justice and prevent substantial hardship or prejudice.

In matrimonial matters, the convenience of the wife is a significant consideration, particularly where travel, financial circumstances, minor children, or other factors materially impede her participation; however, it is not an inflexible rule requiring transfer in every case.

The Court relied on Sadhna Singh v. Mrityunjay Singh, which requires a cumulative assessment of residence, economic and social circumstances, connected proceedings, accessibility, and transportation.

The Court relied on Anjana Rana v. Navin Singh, which recognises the relevance of the wife’s convenience, connected proceedings, and travel inconvenience while holding that their mere existence does not create an automatic right to transfer.

It also relied on Arshad Hussain v. Nazia Parveen for the principle that an apprehension of prejudice or danger must have a real, reasonable, and substantial basis.

The Court treated the applicant’s residence at Hamirpur as a disputed circumstance because the address disclosed in the transfer application indicated Pukhrayan, District Kanpur Dehat, which was proximate to Kanpur Nagar.

Even assuming that she resided at Hamirpur, she produced no specific material showing that transportation was unavailable, that frequent personal attendance was required, or that she could not effectively participate through legal representation.

The pendency of the Domestic Violence Act and BNSS proceedings at Hamirpur was relevant but did not, by itself, justify transfer or create a vested right in the applicant.

Her safety apprehension was also unsupported by specific and immediate circumstances demonstrating that she could not safely attend the Kanpur proceedings; moreover, the opposite party had raised a competing safety apprehension concerning Hamirpur.

On a cumulative assessment, the Court found that the material disclosed ordinary travel inconvenience rather than substantial hardship, prejudice, or an impediment to fair and effective participation sufficient to invoke Section 24 CPC.

The transfer application was accordingly dismissed.

The Family Court, Kanpur Nagar, was directed to endeavour to proceed with the divorce case expeditiously and avoid unnecessary adjournments.

The Court clarified that its observations were confined to the transfer application and would not affect adjudication of the matrimonial dispute or any connected proceedings on their merits.