Withdrawal of premature retirement orders entails consequential service benefits, while permitting fresh orders in accordance with law.

The applicant, Shri Naveen Prakash Nimesh, an AGM in the Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL), challenged an order dated 11 February 2025 prematurely retiring him under Rule 4.0(3) of the SAIL Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977, on grounds including inefficiency, doubtful integrity, conduct unbecoming of an employee, and obstruction of efficiency.

His statutory appeal against the premature retirement was rejected by order dated 21 March 2025 without elaboration beyond recording that it lacked merit.

The applicant filed the present Original Application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking quashing of both orders, reinstatement, continuity of service, back wages, allowances, and consequential benefits.

SAIL contested the claim by filing a counter reply, to which the applicant filed a rejoinder.

During arguments, SAIL sought liberty to withdraw the impugned orders and pass fresh orders in accordance with the applicable rules and law. The applicant consented to that request.

Whether the orders dated 11 February 2025 and 21 March 2025 concerning the applicant’s premature retirement were liable to be quashed or withdrawn.

Whether the respondents could be granted liberty to issue fresh orders in accordance with the applicable rules and law, and whether the applicant was entitled to consequential service benefits.

The Tribunal exercised jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which enables an aggrieved employee to challenge service-related orders before the Central Administrative Tribunal.

The premature-retirement order was issued under Rule 4.0(3) of the SAIL Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977, which was the governing service rule invoked by SAIL.

The Tribunal applied the procedural principle that, where the employer itself seeks withdrawal of the challenged orders and the applicant consents, the matter may be disposed of without adjudicating the merits, while reserving the employer’s authority to take fresh action in accordance with the governing rules and law.

The Tribunal did not examine whether the allegations of inefficiency, doubtful integrity, or unbecoming conduct substantively justified premature retirement, nor did it determine the legality of the appeal rejection on merits.

Instead, on SAIL’s request and the applicant’s consent, it directed withdrawal of both impugned orders.

Since withdrawal would negate the operative effect of the premature-retirement order and its appellate confirmation, the Tribunal further directed payment of all consequential benefits under the relevant rules.

At the same time, it preserved SAIL’s power to pass fresh orders, provided that any such action complied with the applicable rules and law; the applicant was left free to challenge any adverse fresh order through appropriate legal remedies.

The applicant was held entitled to consequential benefits under the relevant rules, to be released within six weeks from withdrawal of the impugned orders.

SAIL was granted liberty to pass fresh orders in accordance with the applicable rules and law, subject to the applicant’s right to pursue legal remedies against such orders.

No order as to costs was made.