Withholding salary for services rendered constitutes a continuing wrong, defeating delay-and-laches objections.

The petitioner was appointed as a Block Teacher by letter dated 28 December 2010 and joined the school on 3 January 2011.

Following an inquiry into complaints concerning 72 appointments, the Economic Offences Unit found no illegality in the appointments of 58 teachers, including the petitioner; 14 others were reported to have irregular appointments.

Some teachers obtained orders for payment of salary from the District Appellate Authority in 2016, which were affirmed by the State Appellate Authority and the High Court.

The petitioner later sought similar relief before the District Appellate Authority in 2018, but her claim was rejected on grounds including alleged illegality and delay. The State Appellate Authority affirmed that rejection, treating her as a “fence-sitter”. She challenged both orders in this writ petition.

Whether the petitioner’s claim for salary for the period she rendered service could be rejected as time-barred or on grounds of delay and laches, given the alleged continuing non-payment of salary?

Whether the authorities could reject the petitioner’s claim as an allegedly illegal or irregular appointee, despite the inquiry findings and orders concerning similarly situated teachers appointed under the same appointment process?

Whether the petitioner was entitled to continue discharging her duties and receive the benefits extended to similarly situated untrained teachers in light of the Supreme Court’s order concerning acquisition of the requisite qualification?

A continuing wrong may constitute a continuing cause of action and may be considered despite delay, subject to exceptions where, for example, third-party rights are affected; service claims may otherwise be rejected for limitation or delay and laches.

The “fence-sitter” principle, as discussed in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347, may bar relief where a person delays challenging an adverse action and seeks parity only after others succeed.

The Court also relied on the Supreme Court’s order in Abdul Baqui Ansari & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., arising from SLP (C) No. 25298 of 2023, which allowed teachers in service on 31 March 2015, including those terminated, time until 31 August 2028 to acquire the D.El.Ed qualification.

The judgment further applied the principle that similarly situated persons should receive consistent treatment where their claims arise from the same appointment process and the relevant circumstances are materially alike.

The Court held that the petitioner’s claim was not barred by delay because the non-payment of salary for services rendered constituted a continuing cause of action, and no third-party interests were implicated.

It considered the petitioner part of the 58 teachers whose appointments the inquiry had not found illegal, and noted that no proceeding or show-cause notice had been issued against those appointments.

The District Appellate Authority therefore erred by deciding the validity of her appointment when the claim before it concerned salary, particularly given the orders granting salary to other teachers appointed under the same memo.

The Court also found discriminatory the petitioner’s exclusion from attendance and work while other untrained teachers were permitted to continue under the Supreme Court’s order.

It directed the respondents to extend to the petitioner the salary and other benefits granted to similarly situated teachers, and to allow her to discharge her duties in accordance with the Supreme Court’s order concerning the qualification deadline.