Without Section 12(2) notice, a land-acquisition reference cannot be dismissed as time-barred.

The appellants’ predecessor owned land at Village Devdanti, which was acquired in 1973–74 for the “Vatrak Jalagar Yojna.” The Land Acquisition Officer made the award on 28 November 1977.

The original claimant raised objections under the Land Acquisition Act on 12 September 1989, approximately 4,067 days after the award. The Land Acquisition Officer referred the matter to the Reference Court only in 2024, after approximately 12,904 days.

The Additional Senior Civil Judge, Bayad, dismissed Land Reference Case No. 170 of 2024 as time-barred on 1 October 2024.

The claimants challenged that dismissal before the High Court, relying on a Coordinate Bench decision involving the effect of non-communication of an award under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act.

Whether the reference could be dismissed as time-barred solely on the basis of the date of the award when the record did not establish that the award, or its essential contents, had been communicated to the claimants under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act.

Whether, in the absence of proof of communication of the award, the matter ought to be remanded to the Reference Court for adjudication on merits.

Whether any equitable limitation should be imposed regarding interest for the period of delay attributable to the claimants.

The Court applied Sections 12(2) and 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 12(2) obliges the Collector to give immediate notice of the award, including its essential contents, to interested persons who were not present when the award was made; the limitation for seeking a reference under Section 18 ordinarily runs from legally effective knowledge or communication of the award.

Relying on Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500, the Court held that “the date of the award” is not merely the date on which the Collector signs or files the award, but the date on which it is communicated to, or known actually or constructively by, the affected person.

The Court also relied on State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum, AIR 1963 SC 1604, and the Gujarat decisions in Rajat Hirabhai Motibhai v. Deputy Collector and Heirs of deceased Aher Naran Maiya Bhupat Naranbhai, which establish that mere knowledge of the existence of an award is insufficient; knowledge must extend to its essential contents.

Premji Nathu was relied upon for the principle that a copy of the award should be supplied with the Section 12(2) notice so that the landowner can effectively exercise the right to seek a reference.

Although the objections and reference were filed after substantial delays, the Court found that the record did not show that any notice of the award had been issued to, or received by, the claimants.

Since communication of the award is a statutory obligation and is material for computing limitation under Section 18, the claimants’ right to seek a reference could not be defeated mechanically by reckoning limitation from 28 November 1977.

Dismissing the reference solely on limitation, without determining whether the award had been communicated and without examining the compensation claim on merits, would cause injustice in a compulsory acquisition matter.

The Court therefore followed the Coordinate Bench’s approach and held that the reference should be restored and decided afresh on merits.

However, balancing equities, it denied interest on any enhanced compensation for the period between the award dated 28 November 1977 and the filing of objections on 12 September 1989.

The Reference Court’s order dated 1 October 2024 dismissing Land Reference Case No. 170 of 2024 was quashed and set aside, and the reference was restored to its original file and remanded for fresh adjudication on merits.

The claimants were held disentitled to interest on any enhanced compensation for the period from 28 November 1977 to 12 September 1989, and one appellant was directed to file an affidavit to that effect.

The record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the Reference Court, and the Registry was directed to retain the affidavit on record.