Without Section 12(2) notice, limitation cannot defeat a land-acquisition reference, which must be decided on merits.

In brief

The question

Whether the claimants’ reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was liable to be dismissed as time-barred when the record did not establish that notice of the award, including its essential contents, had been served upon them.

The court held

The appeal was partly allowed.

It also directed

The Reference Court’s order dated 1 October 2024 dismissing Land Reference Case No. 176 of 2024 was quashed and set aside, and the reference was restored and remanded for fresh adjudication on merits.

The claimants were held disentitled to interest on any enhanced compensation for the period between 12 March 1975 and 12 September 1989.

One appellant was directed to file an affidavit accepting that restriction, and the Registry was directed to place it on record.

01Facts

The appellants’ land situated at Village Devdanti was acquired in 1973–74 for the Vatrak Jalagar Yojna.

¶ 3 · p. 1

The acquisition award was passed on 12 March 1975.

¶ 3 · p. 1

The original claimant filed objections before the Land Acquisition Officer on 12 September 1989, approximately 5,299 days after the award.

¶ 3.1 · p. 2

The reference was thereafter made to the Civil Court only in 2024, after a delay of approximately 12,664 days.

¶ 3.1 · p. 2

The Reference Court dismissed Land Reference Case No. 176 of 2024 on 1 October 2024, holding that the reference was time-barred.

¶ 3.2 · p. 2

The claimants challenged that dismissal in the present first appeal.

¶ 2 · p. 1

02Issues

i.Whether the claimants’ reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was liable to be dismissed as time-barred when the record did not establish that notice of the award, including its essential contents, had been served upon them.

¶ 3.1–3.2, 6–6.1 · pp. 2–9

ii.Whether the matter ought to be remanded to the Reference Court for adjudication on merits, subject to an equitable denial of interest for the period of delay between the award and the filing of objections.

¶ 6.1–7 · pp. 9–10

03Law Applied

The Court applied Sections 12(2) and 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Section 12(2) requires the Collector to give immediate notice of the award to interested persons who were not present when it was made, while Section 18 provides the statutory right to seek a reference against the Collector’s award, subject to limitation.

Relying on Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500, the Court held that the “date of the award” for limitation purposes involves actual or constructive communication of the award to the affected person, and not merely the date on which it was signed or filed.

¶ 6 · pp. 3–7

Under State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum, AIR 1963 SC 1604, knowledge of the award means knowledge of its essential contents, not merely knowledge that an award exists.

¶ 6 · pp. 7–8

The Court also relied on Rajat Hirabhai Motibhai v. Deputy Collector, Heirs of deceased Aher Naran Maiya Bhupat Naranbhai, and Premji Nathu, which establish the Collector’s obligation to communicate the award or its essential contents and to supply an effective opportunity to seek a reference.

¶ 6–7 · pp. 7–9

Provisions in the judgment · 3

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 Section 11Section 12Section 18

04Reasoning

The Court found that the record did not indicate either issuance or receipt of notice under Section 12(2) by the claimants.

¶ 7 · p. 9

Applying the above authorities, it held that limitation could not mechanically be computed from the date on which the award was passed where communication of the award and its essential contents had not been established.

¶ 7 · p. 9

Dismissing the reference solely on limitation, without adjudicating the compensation claim on merits, would unjustly defeat the claimants’ statutory right in respect of compulsorily acquired land.

¶ 7 · p. 9

However, to balance the equities arising from the claimants’ delayed filing of objections, the Court denied interest on any enhanced compensation for the period from 12 March 1975 to 12 September 1989.

¶ 7 · p. 9