Without statutory notice under Section 12(2), limitation for a Section 18 reference does not commence.

The appellants’ land at Village Devdanti was acquired for the Vatrak Jalagar Yojna in 1973–74, and the award was passed on 12 March 1975.

The original claimant submitted objections to the Land Acquisition Officer on 12 September 1989, approximately 5,299 days after the award. The reference was forwarded to the Reference Court only in 2024, after approximately 12,664 days.

The Additional Senior Civil Judge, Bayad, dismissed Land Reference Case No. 181 of 2024 as time-barred on 1 October 2024.

In appeal, the claimants contended that no notice or communication of the award had been served upon them and relied on a Coordinate Bench decision directing remand in similar circumstances.

Whether the reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was liable to be dismissed as time-barred when the record did not establish communication of the award or service of notice under Section 12(2).

Whether the matter ought to be remanded to the Reference Court for adjudication on merits despite the delay in filing the objections and making the reference.

Whether the claimants could claim interest on any enhanced compensation for the period between the date of the award and the date on which objections were filed.

The Court applied Sections 12(2) and 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 12(2) imposes an obligation on the Collector to give immediate notice of the award, including its essential contents, to interested persons who were not present when the award was made.

Under Section 18, limitation for seeking a reference begins from the date on which the award is communicated or becomes known, actually or constructively, rather than merely from the date on which it is signed or filed. This principle was derived from Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500.

The Court also relied on State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum, AIR 1963 SC 1604, holding that knowledge of an award means knowledge of its essential contents; Rajat Hirabhai Motibhai v. Deputy Collector, requiring communication of the essential contents of the award; and Premji Nathu, emphasising that a copy of the award should accompany the Section 12(2) notice to enable an effective reference application.

In the absence of such notice, the claimant’s statutory right to seek a reference cannot be defeated solely on limitation; however, equitable relief may justify denial of interest for the period of delay.

The Reference Court had treated the dates of the award, objections, and reference as mechanically determinative of limitation. The High Court held that this approach was unsustainable because the record did not show that notice under Section 12(2), or the essential contents of the award, had been communicated to the claimants.

Applying Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh and the related authorities, the Court reasoned that the limitation period could not effectively operate against the claimants without proof of actual or constructive knowledge of the award.

Since the acquisition was compulsory and dismissal on limitation alone could deprive the claimants of a determination of fair compensation, the reference required adjudication on merits.

At the same time, to balance the equities arising from the long delay between the award and the objections, the Court denied interest on any enhanced compensation for that period.

The judgment and order dated 1 October 2024 dismissing Land Reference Case No. 181 of 2024 as time-barred was quashed and set aside, and the reference was restored and remanded to the concerned Reference Court for fresh adjudication on merits.

The claimants were declared disentitled to interest on any enhanced compensation for the period from 12 March 1975 to 12 September 1989.

One appellant was directed to file an affidavit to that effect, and the record and proceedings were ordered to be transmitted to the Reference Court.