Writ court can quash a Section 16 order if the Arbitral Tribunal abdicates its jurisdiction to decide limitation.

The Petitioner and Respondent No. 2 entered into a partnership deed in 2013

Following disputes regarding alleged forgery and illegal bank operations, the Petitioner lodged an FIR in 2017

Respondent No. 2 invoked arbitration via notice on September 4, 2017

On May 31, 2023—nearly six years later—Respondent No. 2 filed an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("the Act") for the appointment of an arbitrator

The High Court appointed Respondent No. 3 as the sole arbitrator on August 5, 2025

The Petitioner filed an application under Section 16 of the Act challenging the Tribunal's jurisdiction, arguing the Section 11 application was time-barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act

The Arbitral Tribunal rejected the application on October 9, 2025, holding it had no jurisdiction to review the High Court's referral on the aspect of limitation

The Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash this order

1. Whether the High Court under Article 226 can interfere in an interlocutory order passed by an arbitrator under Section 16 of the Act?

2. Whether the High Court, before appointing an arbitrator under Section 11(6), is required to adjudicate on the jurisdictional issue of limitation?

3. Whether the Arbitral Tribunal erred in law by refusing to adjudicate the Section 16 objection regarding the limitation of the Section 11 application?

The Court applied Section 5 of the Act regarding minimal judicial interference

The doctrine of "competence-competence" under Section 16, which empowers a tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction

The Court relied on Bhaven Construction v. Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd., which permits Writ intervention in "exceptional rarity" where a party is left remediless or there is "bad faith"

The Court further applied the principles from In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements and SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spg., establishing that post-2015 Amendment, the Section 11 Court’s scope is confined strictly to the "existence" of an arbitration agreement, leaving all other preliminary issues, including limitation, to the Arbitral Tribunal.

The Court reasoned that the 2015 insertion of Section 11(6-A) curtailed the High Court's power at the referral stage to a mere "examination" of the agreement's existence, rather than a "ruling" on merits or mixed questions of law and fact like limitation

Consequently, the Arbitral Tribunal’s reasoning—that it could not re-examine the High Court's referral—was a "patent abdication" of its statutory duty under Section 16

The Court found the Tribunal's order "inherently contradictory" because the Tribunal acknowledged that limitation is a jurisdictional issue but refused to decide it, claiming the High Court had already settled it

Since Section 16(5) forces a party to proceed to a final award before challenging a jurisdictional rejection, the Petitioner was left effectively remediless against a patently illegal refusal to exercise jurisdiction

This satisfied the high threshold for Writ interference under Article 226

The Court quashed the order dated October 9, 2025. It directed the Arbitral Tribunal to adjudicate the Petitioner's Section 16 application relating to the limitation of the Section 11(6) filing as a preliminary objection on its merits and to do so expeditiously.

The Writ Petition was allowed