Writ Court cannot quash an FIR where registration was specifically directed by a final judicial order.

The petitioners filed a writ petition seeking to quash the FIR dated 16.12.2025 (Crime No. 0323 of 2025) registered under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the IPC.

Respondent No. 3 (the informant) alleged that his deceased sister, Uma Rathi, paid the petitioners ₹80 lacs as earnest money for a plot in 2011.

Instead of executing the sale deed in her favor, the petitioners allegedly conspired and sold the property to a third party, Udit Narain, in 2012.

Procedurally, the informant's application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was initially treated as a complaint and dismissed by the Magistrate, a decision upheld by the Sessions Judge.

However, a learned Single Judge of the High Court, vide order dated 21.11.2025 in a petition under Article 227 (No. 13610 of 2025), set aside those orders and specifically directed the Police to register the FIR and investigate.

Whether the High Court, exercising its writ jurisdiction, can quash an FIR that was registered pursuant to a specific direction issued by a coordinate Bench of the same Court in a previous inter partes proceeding.

Indian Penal Code, 1860, specifically Section 420 (Cheating), Sections 467, 468, 471 (Forgery), and Section 406 (Criminal Breach of Trust).

Principle of finality of judgments and judicial discipline, established by the doctrine that a judgment rendered inter partes which has not been challenged in a higher forum (such as the Supreme Court) becomes final and binding on the parties and cannot be nullified by a coordinate Bench.

The Bench initially observed that the dispute appeared civil in nature, involving an unregistered agreement to sell and the refund of earnest money, with no apparent evidence of forgery.

The Court found itself legally constrained by the procedural history as a learned Single Judge, in a previous Article 227 petition between the same parties, had already adjudicated that the allegations prima facie disclosed cognizable offenses (cheating and misappropriation) and had issued a mandatory direction to the SHO to register the FIR.

The Bench noted that since the petitioners did not challenge the Single Judge's order before the Supreme Court, that order attained finality.

Consequently, the Court reasoned that quashing the FIR would effectively mean "nullifying" or "setting aside" a final judgment of a coordinate Bench, which is impermissible in law.

The writ petition was dismissed, and the interim order dated 24.04.2026 was vacated.