Writ Courts Cannot Challenge Rejection of Nomination Papers Due to the Express Bar Under Article 329(b)

The Petitioner, a candidate for the Indian National Congress, filed her nomination for the Rajya Sabha biennial elections in Madhya Pradesh.

The Returning Officer rejected her nomination on June 9, 2026, on the grounds that she failed to disclose a pending criminal case in her Form-26 Affidavit, despite having knowledge of the summons issued by a Magisterial Court.

The Petitioner approached the Election Commission of India, but no orders were passed.

The Petitioner subsequently moved the Supreme Court under Article 32, arguing that the rejection was ex-facie illegal as Section 33A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, only requires disclosure of cases where charges have been framed for offences punishable by two years or more, which had not occurred in her case.

1. Whether a Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution is maintainable against the rejection of a nomination paper during an ongoing election process in view of the bar under Article 329(b).

2. Whether the non-disclosure of a pending criminal case prior to the stage of framing of charges constitutes a valid ground for the rejection of a nomination.

Article 329(b) of the Constitution of India, which mandates that no election to Parliament or State Legislatures shall be called in question except by an election petition.

N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal [1952 SCR 218], which established that the term "election" connotes the entire process from notification to the declaration of result, and that improper rejection of a nomination is a ground for an election petition, not a writ.

Section 33A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Rule 4A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, specifically "Form 26," which requires disclosure of "pending criminal cases".

Following the logic in Ponnuswami, the Court reasoned that Article 329(b) is a "self-contained code" that ousts the jurisdiction of all courts, including the High Courts under Article 226 and the Supreme Court under Article 32, once the election process has commenced.

The Court observed that allowing a parallel "attack" on election proceedings at an intermediate stage would lead to anomalies and upset the election time-schedule.

The Court noted the Respondents' counter-argument that Form 26 of the 1961 Rules requires disclosure of all pending cases regardless of the stage.

The Court declined to rule on the merits of the rejection, holding that any such determination must be made by a Special Tribunal through an election petition.

The Court held that the Petitioner’s sole remedy for the improper rejection of a nomination is to file an election petition after the conclusion of the election process.

The Court clarified that its observations were limited to deciding maintainability and would not prejudice a future election petition filed before the High Court.