Writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised against DRT orders when efficacious statutory remedies exist under SARFAESI Act.

The Respondent-borrowers (M/s G.S.M. Bricks and Tiles) defaulted on three loans secured by a mortgaged house.

The Appellant-Bank initiated recovery under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, leading to an auction sale on 06.05.2025 and issuance of a Sale Certificate to the auction purchaser (Respondent No. 4).

The Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), Lucknow, vide order dated 20.09.2025, rejected the borrowers' interim application to restrain the Bank from taking possession, citing compliance with statutory procedures.

Instead of preferring a statutory appeal, the borrowers filed a writ petition.

The learned Single Judge quashed the DRT’s order on its first day of listing, labeling it "non-speaking," without allowing the Bank to file a counter-affidavit or notifying the auction purchaser.

The Bank challenged this in the present Special Appeal.

1. Whether a Special Appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, is maintainable against a judgment of a Single Judge arising from DRT proceedings.

2. Whether the Writ Court was justified in entertaining and allowing a challenge against the DRT’s interim order despite the availability of an alternative statutory remedy under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act.

3. Whether the High Court could exercise jurisdiction under Article 227 when the same was not assigned to that specific Bench by the Chief Justice's roster.

The Court applied Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, noting that since DRT is constituted under Parliament's banking powers (Entry 45, List I), appellate exclusionary clauses do not apply.

It relied heavily on the "rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy," citing *United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon* (2010), which mandates that High Courts must not bypass the SARFAESI Act's statutory framework except in extreme cases like lack of jurisdiction or violation of natural justice.

The Court further applied the doctrine of "Master of Roster," affirming that a Judge must possess the specific jurisdiction assigned by the Chief Justice to pass valid orders.

The Court found that the Single Judge erred in classifying the DRT’s order as "non-speaking," as the Tribunal had recorded three pages of contentions and factual findings before reaching its conclusion.

Since the order was reasoned and passed after hearing both sides, it was squarely appealable under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act; thus, bypassing this remedy was "in the teeth of" Supreme Court precedents.

Procedurally, the Court noted that allowing a writ petition on the first day without notice to the auction purchaser (the new legal owner) violated equity and fair play.

Furthermore, upon examining the 31.07.2025 roster, the Court found the Single Judge (sitting in Court No. 6) lacked the delegated authority to exercise Article 227 powers over DRT matters, which were exclusively assigned to Court No. 7.

The Division Bench held that the Single Judge's judgment was without jurisdiction and violated the settled law regarding alternative remedies.

Consequently, the Court allowed the Special Appeal and quashed the Single Judge's judgment, granting the borrowers liberty to approach the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act.