Writ Jurisdiction Cannot Be Invoked by Challenging Vires of Parent Act Simply to Bypass AFT Machinery

The Petitioner, a Lieutenant Colonel in the Indian Army (SCO 2007 batch), filed a writ petition under Article 226 challenging the promotion process and result dated 27.03.2026, which denied him empanelment.

He alleged "systemic, cumulative, and continuing discrimination" in the deferment of his Selection Board compared to the Regular 2007 batch.

Crucially, the Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Sections 14, 21, 30, and 33 of the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) Act, 2007, praying they be declared unconstitutional or read down to ensure the High Court’s jurisdiction is not ousted in cases involving fundamental rights.

1. Whether Sections 14, 21, 30, and 33 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, are unconstitutional or violative of the basic structure of the Constitution.

2. Whether the High Court should entertain a writ petition involving "systemic discrimination" as a court of first instance, bypassing the Armed Forces Tribunal.

3. Whether the inclusion of a challenge to the vires of the AFT Act allows a litigant to bypass the statutory remedy for service matters.

L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI established that while Tribunals cannot test the vires of their parent statutes, they remain the "only courts of first instance" for matters within their jurisdiction; litigants cannot approach High Courts directly by merely questioning the vires of secondary legislation.

Section 14 of the AFT Act, 2007, defining the Tribunal's jurisdiction over "service matters" as defined in Section 3(o).

UOI v. Parashotam Dass and the Full Bench decision in Squadron Leader Neelam Chahar v. UOI, affirming that AFT is competent to hear challenges involving rules, circulars, and fundamental rights.

The Court observed that the Petitioner’s grievances regarding seniority and promotion (prayers b to h) were quintessentially "service matters" falling squarely under Section 3(o) of the AFT Act.

The Court rejected the Petitioner's argument that "systemic discrimination" involving Articles 14 and 16 necessitates High Court intervention, noting that every service dispute inherently involves fundamental rights and the AFT is fully competent to adjudicate them.

Regarding the challenge to the parent Act (prayer a), the Court found it to be a "strained effort" to forcibly invoke writ jurisdiction.

It held that Section 14(1) must be read harmoniously with Section 14(2); since the dispute is amenable to the AFT, the High Court is coram non judice as a court of first instance.

The Court also upheld Section 21 (exhaustion of remedies) as a "salutary provision" and found no substance in the challenge to Sections 30 and 33.

The Court dismissed the challenge to the vires of the Act (Prayer A) and, since the Petitioner refused to abandon that prayer to pursue the remaining reliefs before the Tribunal, the entire writ petition was dismissed.

The holding affirms that the AFT remains the primary forum for all service matters, including those alleging complex discrimination, and the High Court will not permit the "forced" inclusion of constitutional challenges to bypass statutory exhaustion.