Writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to resolve disputed employer-employee relationships in outsourced, non-statutory service contracts.

The Petitioner, a Civil Engineer, was engaged at the headquarters of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) [Respondent No. 1] starting in June 2012

Although he worked continuously at ICAI for over seven years, his formal employment was routed through a succession of private outsourcing contractors, the last being M4 Solutions Pvt. Ltd. [Respondent No. 2]

On 4th October 2019, Respondent No. 2 discharged the Petitioner from duty, citing Clause 9 of his outsourcing letter which prohibited participating in strikes or demonstrations

The Petitioner initially approached the Conciliation Officer under the Industrial Disputes (ID) Act, but the proceedings ended in a failure report on 5th February 2021

The Petitioner subsequently filed this writ petition seeking reinstatement, alleging the contracting arrangement was a "sham" and that his discharge violated constitutional rights under Article 19

1. Whether the writ petition is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution against ICAI and a private contractor in the context of a service dispute

2. Whether disputed questions regarding a "sham" contract, the Petitioner’s status as a "workman," and the existence of an employer-employee relationship can be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction

A writ lies only where a body discharges a public duty with a "public law element." Relying on Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas and Binny Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan

Even statutory bodies are not amenable to writ jurisdiction for employment disputes governed by pure contracts without statutory backing. Per St. Mary’s Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava

Employer-employee relationships and the genuineness of outsourcing must be decided by industrial adjudicators through evidence rather than summary writ proceedings. Per Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. National Union Waterfront Workers and Balwant Rai Saluja v. Air India Ltd.

The Court reasoned that ICAI’s statutory nature under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, does not automatically subject its personnel management to Article 226, as the dispute lacked a "public law element" and did not involve ICAI’s regulatory functions

The Court found that the Petitioner’s claim—that ICAI was the "real" employer—involved complex factual assessments of control and supervision that cannot be resolved on affidavits

The Petitioner’s conflicting stands (claiming to be a "workman" before the Labour Commissioner, then a "non-workman" engineer before the High Court) underscored that his legal status under Section 2(s) of the ID Act is a matter of evidence regarding his dominant duties

The Court held that even though the Petitioner invoked fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a) and (c) regarding union membership, these constitutional pleas could not bypass the need to first establish the foundational facts of his employment via an appropriate trial-based forum

The petition was dismissed. The Court clarified that it had not returned findings on whether the Petitioner was a "workman" or if the contract was a "sham," leaving these issues open for adjudication by a competent industrial or civil forum