Writ jurisdiction cannot bypass statutory appeals where natural-justice claims involve disputed facts and substantial delay.

The Petitioner arrived at Indira Gandhi International Airport, New Delhi, from Riyadh on 17 February 2024 and opted for the Green Channel. Customs authorities recovered two gold bars weighing 233 grams from his possession, valued at ₹13,07,412, and detained them under a Detention Receipt.

The Petitioner made a statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, admitting possession and non-declaration of the gold and recording that he did not require a Show Cause Notice or personal hearing.

On 22 April 2024, he submitted a further written request seeking release of the gold, expressing regret, and recording that he did not want a written Show Cause Notice or personal hearing and had received an oral Show Cause Notice.

The Joint Commissioner of Customs subsequently passed an Order-in-Original dated 14 June 2024, absolutely confiscating the gold under Sections 111(d), 111(j), 111(l) and 111(m) of the Act and imposing a penalty of ₹1,30,000 under Section 112.

The Petitioner challenged the order under Article 226, alleging non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of Sections 110 and 124, denial of personal hearing, invalidity of the alleged waiver, and coercion in recording his statement.

Whether the High Court should exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to examine an appealable Order-in-Original under the Customs Act when an efficacious statutory appeal under Section 128 is available?

Whether the Petitioner established a patent violation of natural justice or absence of jurisdiction sufficient to justify bypassing the statutory appellate remedy?

Whether the Petitioner’s challenge, brought nearly two years after the Order-in-Original, was barred or adversely affected by delay and the statutory deeming provision concerning service?

The Court applied the principle that availability of an alternative statutory remedy does not absolutely bar Article 226 jurisdiction but ordinarily requires judicial restraint where the statute provides a specialised appellate mechanism.

Under Section 128 of the Customs Act, an Order-in-Original is appealable before the competent appellate authority.

The Court relied on Assistant Commissioner (CT), LTU, Kakinada v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Healthcare Ltd., which cautions that writ jurisdiction should not ordinarily be used to circumvent the statutory appellate scheme or limitation period, though limited exceptions may exist for want of jurisdiction, flagrant illegality, or patent violation of natural justice.

Sections 110 and 124 govern seizure and the requirement of notice before confiscation or penalty, while Section 153(3) creates a deeming fiction regarding service of communications sent by registered or speed post.

The Court distinguished Shubhangi Gupta v. Commissioner of Customs, where waiver alone could not dispense with the statutory notice requirement, because the present record also contained the Petitioner’s acknowledgment of receiving an oral Show Cause Notice.

It also considered Surjeet Singh Chhabra v. Union of India, concerning the evidentiary relevance of an un-retracted voluntary statement under Section 108.

The Court held that the case did not disclose a patent denial of natural justice warranting extraordinary intervention.

The Petitioner had participated in the proceedings, signed a Section 108 statement admitting possession and non-declaration, and expressly recorded that he did not require a Show Cause Notice or personal hearing.

His subsequent communication dated 22 April 2024 independently recorded receipt of an oral Show Cause Notice and again stated that he did not seek a written notice or personal hearing.

Although the Petitioner alleged coercion, lack of understanding, and signatures on pre-typed or blank documents, those allegations were unsupported by any contemporaneous complaint or retraction and raised disputed factual questions more appropriately examined in statutory appeal.

The Customs authorities possessed jurisdiction over the import, confiscation and penalty proceedings; the challenge concerned the manner in which that jurisdiction was exercised, not an absence of jurisdiction.

Further, the order had been dispatched by speed post, attracting the relevance of Section 153(3), and the petition was filed nearly two years after the order, with no contemporaneous steps taken between April 2024 and February 2026.

These factors militated against bypassing the statutory appeal.

The Court did not decide the merits of the absolute confiscation, the penalty, the evidentiary value of the Section 108 statement, or the precise legal effect of the Petitioner’s communication dated 22 April 2024; those issues were left open for consideration by the competent appellate authority.