Writ jurisdiction cannot reappreciate evidence where Labour Court findings are plausible and evidence-based.

The petitioner claimed that he had been engaged as a caretaker by D.A.V. Public School, Pusa Road, New Delhi, since 2002 and was illegally terminated on 1 December 2009.

The school denied any employer–employee relationship and asserted that the petitioner had never worked for it.

The petitioner relied upon an appointment letter dated 1 January 2004 and a certificate issued by the Headmistress on 17 April 2009, and examined witnesses who claimed knowledge of the school’s management and the relevant signatures.

The PF records produced in evidence did not contain the petitioner’s name.

By award dated 1 June 2015, it rejected the petitioner’s claim, holding that he had failed to prove the employer–employee relationship and that, in any event, he had already crossed the age of superannuation.

The petitioner challenged the award under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

Whether the petitioner established an employer–employee relationship with the respondent school so as to maintain his claim of illegal termination?

Whether the Labour Court’s findings warranted interference in the High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution?

Whether the petitioner was entitled to reinstatement or other relief despite having allegedly attained 62 years of age at the time of termination?

The Court applied the principles governing judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, namely, that the High Court does not sit as an appellate court over findings of fact recorded by a Labour Court and may interfere only where the findings are perverse, based on no evidence or irrelevant evidence, or are such that no reasonable person could have reached them.

Relying on International Airport Authority of India v. International Air Cargo Workers Union, (2009) 13 SCC 374, the Court reiterated that findings supported by relevant material should not be disturbed merely because another view is possible.

The Court also applied the principle that the claimant bears the burden of establishing the foundational employer–employee relationship before obtaining relief for illegal termination.

The Court further held that reinstatement could not be granted where, even on the petitioner’s own case, he had already exceeded the relevant age of superannuation.

The Court found that the petitioner failed to establish the foundational fact of employment.

The appointment letter dated 1 January 2004 did not correspond with his claim of engagement from 2002, and he did not prove that it had been issued by a competent authority or pursuant to a decision of the school’s managing committee.

The evidence of the petitioner’s witnesses was also insufficient: one witness did not establish the requisite authority, while another admitted that he had not worked with the respondent D.A.V. Public School.

In addition, the official PF records covering the relevant period did not mention the petitioner, undermining his claim of regular employment and salary deductions.

Since the Labour Court’s conclusion was based on relevant evidence and constituted at least a plausible view, no perversity or jurisdictional error was shown to justify writ interference.

Independently, the Court held that the petitioner, who was allegedly 62 years old when terminated in 2009, could not claim reinstatement at the time of adjudication, when he was over 70 years old.

The Labour Court’s award rejecting the industrial dispute was neither perverse nor legally unsustainable, and therefore did not warrant interference under Articles 226 or 227.

The Court further held that, in any event, reinstatement could not be granted because the petitioner had already crossed the age of superannuation.

The writ petition was dismissed, and the pending application was also disposed of.