Writ jurisdiction does not extend to contractual service termination lacking statutory or public-law elements.

The petitioner was engaged as a Cluster Facilitator under the JEEVIKA Programme pursuant to the Cluster Facilitator Policy. Her engagement was contractual and carried a fixed honorarium.

By an order dated 10 October 2019, the Chairman, Secretary and Treasurer of Dharohar Jeevika Mahila Sankul Sangh, Cluster–2, Dalsagar, terminated her engagement.

The petitioner challenged the termination under Article 226 of the Constitution, alleging violation of natural justice and contending that JEEVIKA performed a public function.

During the writ proceedings, the Court stayed the operation of the termination order on 28 April 2026. As the petitioner was not initially reinstated or permitted to join, she filed MJC No. 1576 of 2026.

The matters were tagged, following which the respondents accepted the petitioner’s joining in compliance with the Court’s interim order and filed a counter-affidavit.

The respondents thereafter raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition was not maintainable against the Cluster Level Federation, an autonomous body, and that the petitioner’s engagement was purely contractual.

Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable against the Cluster Level Federation on the ground that it performs public functions under the JEEVIKA Programme?

Whether the termination of the petitioner’s contractual engagement as Cluster Facilitator, allegedly in violation of the applicable policy and principles of natural justice, contains a sufficient public-law element to invite judicial review under Article 226?

Whether the petitioner’s contractual service dispute could be adjudicated in the writ jurisdiction despite the absence of statutory service conditions and the employer’s non-State status under Article 12?

Article 226 permits issuance of writs not only against entities falling within Article 12 but also against private persons or bodies discharging a statutory or otherwise legally enforceable public duty, provided the challenged action has a public-law element.

The Court referred to Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, (1975) 1 SCC 421; Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722; and Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111, concerning statutory status, State instrumentality and financial, functional and administrative control.

The Court also relied on The Organizer, Dehri C.D. & C.M. v. State of Bihar, 2014 (1) PLJR 695, and St. Mary’s Educational Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava, (2023) 4 SCC 498.

Under St. Mary’s Educational Society, an ordinary contractual service dispute, absent statutory regulation or a public-law element, is not amenable to Article 226; the employee of a body performing a public function cannot invoke writ jurisdiction for service matters governed only by a non-statutory contract.

The Court accepted that, in principle, Article 226 may extend to a private body performing a public duty.

However, it distinguished the nature of the institution’s broader functions from the particular action challenged.

The petitioner’s engagement was made under the JEEVIKA Cluster Policy, was contractual and honorarium-based, and was not governed by statutory service conditions.

The Cluster Federation was not shown to possess the status of “State” under Article 12, nor was the termination shown to involve an independent public-law obligation.

Consequently, even if the JEEVIKA Programme served a section of the public, the petitioner’s termination concerned only the ordinary contractual relationship between her and the Federation.

Any breach of the policy or contract was therefore a private contractual dispute, not a matter warranting a writ of mandamus.

Accordingly, CWJC No. 5118 of 2021 and MJC No. 1576 of 2026 were dismissed.

The dismissal did not prevent the petitioner from approaching the competent court, forum or authority for appropriate redressal of her grievance.