Writ jurisdiction is unavailable for cooperative society employees’ service grievances absent exceptional circumstances or statutory public duty.

The first respondent was employed as a Junior Assistant in the fourth respondent, a co-operative housing society. He resigned on 11 January 2019; the resignation was accepted and he was relieved from service, but his terminal benefits—including gratuity, provident fund, earned-leave salary, security deposit and other monetary dues—were not settled.

He consequently filed W.P. No. 19725 of 2022 seeking a writ of mandamus for payment of approximately ₹18,30,600 with 12% interest.

The Single Judge allowed the writ petition, relying principally on A. Sengodan v. Registrar of Co-operative Societies, 2015 (6) MLJ 684.

The Managing Director of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Federation appealed, contending that the writ petition was not maintainable under the principles laid down by the Larger Bench in K. Marappan v. Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, (2006) 4 CTC 689, and that the first respondent was not an employee of the appellant Federation.

1. Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable for enforcement of terminal benefits claimed by an employee of a co-operative society whose service conditions are governed by the Act, Rules and the society’s bye-laws?

2. Whether the Single Judge was justified in granting a mandamus by relying on A. Sengodan, notwithstanding the Larger Bench decision in K. Marappan?

3. Whether the first respondent should instead be relegated to the alternative statutory remedy under Section 153 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983?

The Court applied Article 226 of the Constitution and the principles stated by the Larger Bench in K. Marappan v. Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, (2006) 4 CTC 689.

Under Marappan, a writ may lie against a co-operative society that qualifies as “State” under Article 12, or for enforcement of a statutory public duty; however, service conditions governed by a society’s bye-laws cannot ordinarily be enforced through a writ because such bye-laws do not have the force of law.

The Court held that employee service grievances, including claims for terminal benefits, are not “statutory public duties” owed by the society to the public generally.

It further applied the rule that where an efficacious alternative remedy exists, particularly under Section 153 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983, the High Court should ordinarily decline to exercise writ jurisdiction absent special circumstances.

The Court also relied on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680, for the principle that a co-equal Bench must follow the binding decision of a Larger Bench.

The Court treated the claim for gratuity, provident fund, leave salary and other terminal dues as a service-related grievance arising from the respondent’s employment in the co-operative society.

Such a claim did not constitute enforcement of a statutory public duty under Marappan; rather, it was governed by the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, the 1988 Rules, and the society’s applicable bye-laws.

Since the bye-laws did not have the force of law and the society was not shown to be “State” under Article 12, the dispute could not ordinarily be adjudicated through a writ petition.

The availability of a statutory remedy under Section 153, together with the possibility of disputed factual questions concerning the entitlement and non-payment of benefits, reinforced the need to approach the competent statutory authority first.

Accordingly, the Division Bench held that the Single Judge’s reliance on A. Sengodan was inconsistent with the binding Larger Bench ruling in Marappan and could not be sustained.

The order dated 2 April 2026 in W.P. No. 19725 of 2022 was set aside, and the writ appeal was allowed without costs.

The first respondent was granted liberty to file a revision petition under Section 153 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act; any such petition was directed to be entertained without reference to delay and decided on merits, in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible.