Writ jurisdiction is unavailable where an efficacious statutory appeal exists and natural justice has been observed.

The petitioner claimed possession of the disputed property under a lease/rent agreement dated 14 April 2026 executed by the predecessor-in-interest. A civil suit concerning the property was pending, and an interim order had allegedly been granted and extended from time to time.

The Tehsildar, Tehsil Rau, issued a show-cause notice dated 11 August 2026 alleging encroachment upon government land. The petitioner submitted a reply on 14 August 2026, referring to the tenancy documents and the pending civil proceedings. Nevertheless, by order dated 17 August 2026 in Case No. 0022-A-68/2025-26, the Tehsildar directed the petitioner to deposit a penalty of ₹25,000 and remove the alleged encroachment and hand over possession within seven days.

The petitioner challenged that order under Article 226 of the Constitution and also moved the Civil Court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking appropriate interim protection; that application remained pending.

1. Whether the High Court should exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to interfere with the Tehsildar’s order directing payment of penalty and removal of alleged encroachment when an appellate remedy under the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (“MPLRC”) was available.

2. Whether the impugned order was liable to be set aside for violation of natural justice on the ground that it was passed ex parte without a proper opportunity of hearing.

3. Whether the pendency of a civil suit and an interim order therein barred the Revenue Authority from initiating or continuing proceedings concerning alleged encroachment upon government land.

The Court applied Article 226 of the Constitution, under which writ jurisdiction is discretionary and ordinarily not exercised where an alternative efficacious statutory remedy is available, absent exceptional circumstances such as breach of natural justice or lack of jurisdiction.

It relied upon the appellate remedy under Section 44 of the MPLRC against the impugned revenue order.

The Court also considered the principles of natural justice, particularly the requirement of notice and opportunity to respond, and held that those requirements were not violated where the petitioner had received the show-cause notice and submitted a reply.

The petitioner relied upon Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao, AIR 1982 SC 1081, Arun Bharti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, W.A. Nos. 398/2017 and connected matters, and Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1, concerning the limits and exceptions to the alternative-remedy rule; however, the Court found no circumstances warranting writ interference.

The Court further observed that encroachment upon government land is a matter requiring serious consideration and that courts should not lightly interfere with action taken by competent revenue authorities in such cases.

The Court held that the impugned Tehsildar’s order was prima facie appealable under the MPLRC, making the statutory appellate remedy an efficacious alternative to a writ petition.

The petitioner’s natural-justice objection failed because the record showed that a show-cause notice had been issued and that the petitioner had furnished a detailed reply before the order was passed; therefore, the order could not be characterised as having been made without notice or opportunity to respond.

The pendency of the civil suit did not, by itself, justify writ intervention, particularly because the petitioner had already approached the Civil Court under Section 151 CPC for relief after placing the Tehsildar’s order on record.

The Court also distinguished the revenue proceedings from the civil proceedings on the basis that the Tehsildar was dealing with alleged encroachment upon government land, whereas the civil suit involved different reliefs concerning the property.

In view of the available statutory remedy, the absence of a demonstrated jurisdictional or natural-justice violation, and the public interest involved in protecting government land, the Court declined to examine the merits under Article 226.

The petitioner was required to pursue the available appellate remedy under Section 44 of the MPLRC and seek appropriate relief before the pending Civil Court proceedings, if so advised.

No direction for status quo, restraint against coercive action, or expeditious disposal of the Section 151 CPC application was granted. The petition was accordingly dismissed, with the direction “CC as per rules”.