Writ jurisdiction should not be invoked for FIR registration when statutory remedies are available.

In brief

The question

Whether the High Court should exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to direct registration of an FIR when statutory remedies are available for police inaction in registering a cognizable offence?

The court held

The Court held that the application for a writ directing registration of an FIR was not maintainable as the applicant was required to pursue the alternative statutory remedies available under the criminal procedure framework.

It also directed

The application was accordingly dismissed.

01Facts

The applicant alleged that his uncle died due to medical negligence. Although an accidental-death case was recorded, the police did not register an FIR despite the applicant’s representations dated 20 August 2022 and 29 November 2024.

p. 1

In an earlier order dated 25 October 2024, the High Court had directed the Police Inspector, Palanpur East Police Station, to consider the applicant’s representation dated 20 August 2022 in accordance with law and complete the exercise within six weeks.

p. 2

The applicant contended that the representation remained undecided, notwithstanding an FSL report dated 24 October 2024 allegedly indicating discrepancies in the submitted CD and a communication from the Superintendent of Police, Banaskantha, directing investigation.

p. 2

He therefore sought a writ directing the police authorities to register an FIR against the proposed accused persons under the applicable penal and medical-negligence provisions.

pp. 1–3

02Issues

i.Whether the High Court should exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to direct registration of an FIR when statutory remedies are available for police inaction in registering a cognizable offence?

pp. 3–9 · ¶ 4–5

ii.Whether the applicant should be relegated to the statutory remedies before the police hierarchy and the jurisdictional Magistrate instead of being granted a direct writ for registration of an FIR?

pp. 6–9 · ¶ 5–5.1

03Law Applied

The Court applied the principle that Article 226 jurisdiction is extraordinary and discretionary and should ordinarily not be exercised where an efficacious alternative statutory remedy exists.

pp. 3–5

Relying on Sujal Vishwas Attavar v. State of Maharashtra, Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P., Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes, and Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India, the Court reiterated that the statutory mechanism should not ordinarily be bypassed, particularly where disputed facts or evidentiary examination are involved.

pp. 3–6

Under the principles stated in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage, and related authorities, a person aggrieved by non-registration of an FIR must first approach the senior police authority and thereafter the Magistrate for appropriate directions regarding registration and investigation.

pp. 6–8

The Court also referred to the corresponding provisions of the BNSS: Section 173(1) concerning registration of information relating to a cognizable offence, Section 173(4) concerning approach to the Superintendent of Police, and Section 175(3) concerning an application to the Magistrate.

p. 8

The Court treated Article 226 as not being a general or automatic remedy for every grievance concerning police inaction.

pp. 8–9

Provisions in the judgment · 7 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 36 Section 154 Section 156 Section 200 Section 482

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 Section 173 Section 175

04Reasoning

The applicant’s grievance concerned alleged police failure to register an FIR and conduct an appropriate investigation. Applying the rule in Sakiri Vasu and the statutory framework under the BNSS, the Court held that the applicant had an efficacious remedy through the superior police authority and, if necessary, an application before the jurisdictional Magistrate for directions to register the FIR and ensure proper investigation.

pp. 6–9

The existence of the earlier High Court direction and the applicant’s allegations regarding the FSL material did not persuade the Court to bypass the statutory process or exercise writ jurisdiction as a first-instance remedy. Since no exceptional circumstance warranting direct interference under Article 226 was established, the Court declined to issue the requested mandamus.

pp. 8–9