Writ jurisdiction should not interrupt SARFAESI recovery where an efficacious Section 17 remedy is available.

In brief

The question

Whether the vacation notice was liable to be set aside because possession would allegedly contravene the status quo order in the pending partition suit or exceed the property covered by the Bank’s secured claim.

The court held

The Court dismissed the writ petition and declined to set aside the vacation notice.

It also directed

It left open the petitioner’s right to approach the appropriate forum for redress in accordance with law.

01Facts

M/s. Rina Textiles, whose proprietor was Smt. Juliet Ghosh, obtained credit facilities secured by a mortgage over 0.005 acres of land and a showroom. The petitioner, Basudeb Ghosh, was a guarantor.

¶ 9

Following default, the Bank issued measures under Sections 13(2) and 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act and obtained an order under Section 14 authorising physical possession of the secured asset.

¶ 9

A separate partition suit concerning a larger, 0.008-acre property was pending, with an interim status quo order; the Bank was not a party to that suit.

¶ 10

In an earlier appeal, the Division Bench had stated that the Bank’s claim was restricted to the 0.005 acres and showroom, and that the sale formalities could proceed.

¶ 11–12

The petitioner then challenged an Advocate Commissioner’s “vacation notice” dated 15 September 2026, seeking to prevent possession.

¶ 1, 3

02Issues

i.Whether the vacation notice was liable to be set aside because possession would allegedly contravene the status quo order in the pending partition suit or exceed the property covered by the Bank’s secured claim.

¶ 3, 10–13

ii.Whether the petitioner should pursue the statutory remedy under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act rather than invoke the writ jurisdiction.

¶ 14

03Law Applied

Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act provides an efficacious remedy to “any person” aggrieved by measures taken under Section 13(4) or action under Section 14; the expression includes borrowers, guarantors, and other affected persons.

¶ 14

The Court also treated taking physical possession of an asset already sold as a consequential step in the sale proceedings.

¶ 13

It relied on PH‌R Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank & Ors., 2024 INSC 297, for the principle that courts should not ordinarily entertain writ petitions used to interrupt recovery proceedings where a statutory alternative remedy is available.

¶ 14

Provisions in the judgment · 4 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 Section 14 Section 13 Section 2 Section 17

04Reasoning

The Court found that the vacation notice concerned the same 0.005 acres and showroom identified in the Section 14 order and the prior Division Bench order; it did not extend to other property or contravene the limits previously placed on the Bank’s claim.

¶ 12–13

The status quo order in the partition suit did not bind the Bank, which was not a party to that proceeding.

¶ 10

As a guarantor and a person potentially aggrieved by the possession measure, the petitioner could seek relief under Section 17.

¶ 14

In light of that remedy and the principle against using writ proceedings to obstruct recovery, the Court declined to interfere.

¶ 14