Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be invoked to adjudicate disputed questions of fact in contractual recovery matters.

The Petitioner, a consulting firm, was awarded a work order on 18.11.2020 by Respondent No. 1 (Municipal Council, Kumhari) for Project Management Consultancy (PMC) services under the AMRUT Mission.

The Petitioner performed services for nearly two years and raised multiple running bills.

Despite the Petitioner’s performance, Respondent No. 1 failed to release payments, citing a lack of fund allocation and lack of consent from State authorities.

On 01.03.2024, Respondent No. 1 terminated the work order.

The Petitioner submitted various representations and a legal notice for the payment of outstanding dues totaling approximately ₹1.07 Crores, which remained unaddressed.

Consequently, the Petitioner approached the High Court seeking a writ of Mandamus to compel the Respondents to decide their representations and release the admitted dues.

1. Whether the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution, should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute involving non-payment of dues arising out of a contractual agreement?

2. Whether a direction can be issued to decide a representation when the underlying claim is essentially a contractual dispute requiring factual adjudication?

The Court primarily applied the principle that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is generally not the appropriate forum for resolving contractual disputes or recovery of money where factual adjudication is required.

It relied on Chairman, GRIDCO v. Sukamani Das (1999), Union of India v. Puna Hinda (2021), and M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd. v. Sky Power Southeast Solar India (P) Ltd. (2023), which establish that High Courts should refrain from exercising jurisdiction in matters involving disputed questions of fact in contracts.

The Court distinguished Surya Constructions v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2019) [para. 6], noting that while admitted contractual dues cannot be withheld indefinitely by the State, this principle only applies where there is no factual dispute regarding the liability or the extent of work executed.

The Court reasoned that the Petitioner’s grievance is fundamentally rooted in a "contractual arrangement".

Resolving the claim would require determining the extent of work executed, the fulfillment of contractual obligations, and the liability of the Respondents—all of which are "questions which require factual adjudication and appreciation of evidence".

The Court observed that the Petitioner’s attempt to frame the relief as a "direction to decide a representation" was a procedural maneuver to "convert a contractual dispute into a writ proceeding".

While the Petitioner argued the dues were admitted based on inter-departmental correspondence, the Court held that since the termination of the work order was linked to the State's lack of consent, the liability remained a factual issue outside the scope of judicial review under Article 226.

The Court dismissed the petition but reserved liberty for the Petitioner to pursue alternative legal remedies, such as a civil suit or arbitration, to resolve the monetary claims.