Writ jurisdiction was declined where a non-lessee bypassed the available statutory appeal.

The Petitioners filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging an eviction order dated 11.08.2026 passed by Respondent No. 2 under Section 5(1) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (“the Act”).

The challenge principally concerned the eviction order, while the remaining reliefs were stated to be consequential.

The Petitioners relied on the alleged impact of the order on the welfare and care of horses, jockeys, and staff, and contended that the writ petition was maintainable despite the statutory appellate remedy.

The Union of India and Respondent No. 2 objected that the Petitioners lacked locus because the order had been passed against Delhi Race Club, Respondent No. 3, which was the original lessee.

They further submitted that Delhi Race Club had already filed an appeal under Section 9 of the Act.

The Petitioners were given liberty, if otherwise permissible in law, to avail themselves of the Section 9 remedy.

Whether the High Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 when the Act provides a specific statutory appellate remedy against an order under Section 5, and that remedy has already been invoked by the original lessee.

Whether the Petitioners, not being the original lessee against whom the eviction order was passed, had the requisite locus to maintain the writ petition.

The Court applied Article 226 of the Constitution, recognising that the existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to writ jurisdiction.

It relied on the principle stated in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, (1998) 8 SCC 1, that the High Court may exercise writ jurisdiction notwithstanding an alternative remedy where the circumstances warrant interference.

However, the Court held that such jurisdiction should not ordinarily be invoked to bypass an available statutory mechanism absent a compelling circumstance.

Under Sections 5(1) and 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, an eviction order may be passed against an unauthorised occupant and is subject to a statutory appeal, respectively.

The Court found that the eviction order was directed against Delhi Race Club, the original lessee, and not against the Petitioners.

Delhi Race Club had already invoked the statutory appellate remedy under Section 9, demonstrating that the statutory mechanism was available and operative.

Although the Court acknowledged that Article 226 jurisdiction could be exercised despite an alternative remedy, the Petitioners failed to show any compelling circumstance justifying intervention.

The Petitioners’ asserted concerns regarding horses, jockeys, and staff did not overcome the availability of the statutory appeal.

Further, as the Petitioners were not the lessees, they prima facie lacked locus to challenge the eviction order, and any dispute between the Petitioners and Delhi Race Club could not properly be converted into a writ challenge to that order.

It held, prima facie, that the Petitioners lacked locus to maintain the writ petition and that no compelling circumstance existed to bypass the statutory appellate remedy.

The Petitioners were granted liberty, if so advised and otherwise permissible in law, to pursue the remedy under Section 9 of the Act; the question of their locus or entitlement to maintain such an appeal was left open for determination by the competent appellate authority.

The Court expressly clarified that it had not adjudicated the merits of the underlying dispute.