Writ Petition against a Private Entity is Inadmissible for Redressing Purely Contractual Disputes and Factual Grievances

The Petitioner was appointed as a ‘facilitator’ by Respondent No. 1 (IGL) via a Letter of Intent (LOI) dated 21.01.2020 to resolve local disputes and obtain statutory clearances for a CNG station at Minto Road, Delhi

The LOI stipulated a 12-month timeline for operationalization and stated that the award of a 10-year dealership would be at the "discretion of management"

The Petitioner claimed successful commissioning by August 2020, but IGL issued a show-cause notice in October 2022 alleging non-performance and expiry of the LOI

Subsequently, the IGL Board resolved to cancel the LOI and transition to a "Company Owned Company Operated" (COCO) model

The Petitioner challenged the termination letter dated 11.05.2023, seeking execution of a dealership agreement

1. Whether Respondent No. 1 (IGL) is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution

2. Whether the appointment as a ‘facilitator’ created an indefeasible right or a concluded contract for the grant of a dealership

3. Whether the Court can grant specific performance of a determinable commercial contract in writ proceedings

The court applied the "function test" for Article 226, holding that entities discharging public duties are amenable to writ jurisdiction regardless of their status under Article 12, as seen in S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd. and St. Mary’s Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava.

Regarding contractual disputes, the court relied on State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd., which holds that writ petitions are not the proper forum for adjudicating serious factual disputes or breaches of contract.

The court applied Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and the precedent in Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service, establishing that contracts which are inherently determinable cannot be specifically enforced.

The Court first determined that while IGL is not a "State" under Article 12 due to its shareholding and management structure, it is amenable to writ jurisdiction because it provides essential public services (CNG distribution).

However, the Court found the present dispute to be purely private and contractual rather than a matter of public law.

The Court noted significant factual disputes regarding the fulfillment of work and the existence of a concluded contract, making it unsuitable for Article 226.

Critically, the Court observed that the LOI expressly placed the award of dealership at the "discretion of management," meaning the Petitioner had no vested right to it.

Furthermore, the dealership sought was a commercial agreement in its nature determinable; hence, granting the Petitioner's prayer would amount to an impermissible decree of specific performance in a writ petition.

The Court answered that the appointment as a facilitator did not translate into an indefeasible right to a dealership.

It held that in cases of alleged wrongful termination of a determinable contract, the appropriate remedy is a suit for damages, not a writ of mandamus for specific performance.

All interim orders were vacated.