Writ petition for enforcement of a private contract of service without public law element is not maintainable.

The petitioner was appointed as a Pujari at the Darbar of Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine on 27.09.1986 on a consolidated salary of Rs. 700 per month

On 30.06.1988, respondents No. 4 and 5 issued an order discontinuing his services effective 01.07.1988

The petitioner challenged the termination as violative of Articles 14, 16, and 311 of the Constitution, alleging an inquiry was mandatory

He further challenged the vires of Section 14(2) of the J&K Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Act, 1986

The case had a long procedural history, initially allowed in 1998, set aside by a Division Bench in 2000, and finally remanded by the Supreme Court in 2005 for fresh consideration in light of Chain Singh v. Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Board

The Court applied the tests for "State" under Article 12 as established in Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, concluding the Board is not "State" due to lack of government control

It relied on the Division Bench ruling in Omkar Sharma v. Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Board, which held the Board is not amenable to writs for enforcing fundamental rights

Regarding Article 226, the court applied BCCI v. Cricket Association of Bihar and Anandi Mukta Sadguru v. V.R. Rudani, which establish that while Article 226 is broader than Article 12, a "public law element" or "public duty" must be involved for a writ to issue against a non-State body

Finally, it applied the principle from Showkat Ahmad Rather v. Govt. of J&K that writs do not lie for purely private service contracts

The Court reasoned that while the Shrine Board is a statutory body, it lacks the financial, functional, or administrative control of the Government required to qualify as "State" under Article 12; thus, fundamental rights cannot be enforced against it

Although the High Court’s power under Article 226 extends to any person or authority performing public duties, the Court found that the petitioner’s claim was purely of a "private character"

The dispute involved a contract of service between an employee and a non-State entity, which lacks the necessary "public law element" to trigger judicial review

On merits, the Court observed that the petitioner was an adhoc appointee whose termination was non-stigmatic and non-punitive, and as such, he held no vested right to the post once the Board determined his services were no longer required

Even on merits, the Court held that an adhoc employee has no right to continuation in service

The writ petition was dismissed