Writ petition is disposed of where an effective statutory representation remedy remains available.

The petitioner, a Public Distribution System (PDS) dealer holding Licence No. 158/2001 and operating at Panchayat Lodipur, Block Rajgir, Nalanda, challenged the cancellation of her licence by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Rajgir, through Memo No. 650 dated 3 September 2020.

The cancellation was based on allegations of irregularities in the distribution of food grains and charging beneficiaries higher prices. Her statutory appeal under Rule 32(1) of the Bihar Targeted Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2016 was rejected by the Collector-cum-Appellate Authority, Nalanda, on 4 February 2021. Her subsequent revision before the Divisional Commissioner, Patna, was also rejected on 15 June 2023.

Whether the writ petition challenging the cancellation of the petitioner’s PDS licence and the orders of the appellate and revisional authorities was maintainable when an alternative remedy of representation was available under Rule 32(vii) of the Bihar Targeted Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2016?

Whether the petitioner was entitled to a direction for restoration of her PDS licence at the writ stage without the High Court examining the merits of the cancellation proceedings?

The Court applied Rule 32(vii) of the Bihar Targeted Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2016, which empowers the Principal Secretary/Secretary of the Food and Consumer Protection Department to call for records relating to orders passed by the Divisional Commissioner, District Officer, licensing authority, or Sub-Divisional Officer, either suo motu or upon representation.

Where such authority has exercised powers not vested in it, acted illegally without considering the facts, or failed to exercise its jurisdiction, the Principal Secretary may pass an appropriate order.

The Court also applied the principle that a writ petition may ordinarily be declined where an effective alternative statutory remedy is available.

Without entering into the merits of the allegations or the legality of the cancellation orders, the Court held that Rule 32(vii) provided the petitioner with an alternative and effective remedy before the Principal Secretary.

Since the statutory mechanism permitted scrutiny of orders passed by the licensing, appellate, and revisional authorities, the Court considered it appropriate to direct the petitioner to pursue that remedy instead of adjudicating the merits in writ jurisdiction.

The Court further protected the petitioner against technical delay, observing that any delay in filing the representation should be liberally construed because she had approached the High Court within time.

It also required compliance with natural justice by directing that the petitioner be given notice and an opportunity of hearing before any decision was taken.

The petitioner was granted liberty to file a representation before the Principal Secretary under Rule 32(vii) challenging the revisional/appellate order and the cancellation order within one month from receipt of the judgment.

Any delay was to be considered liberally, and the Principal Secretary was directed to provide notice and an opportunity of hearing and conclude the proceedings within three months from receipt of the representation. The decision was to be communicated to the petitioner.