Writ petitions challenging charge memos are maintainable only for jurisdictional error or established mala fides.

The petitioner was appointed as a Typist in 2009 and subsequently promoted to Assistant, Head Clerk, Grade II Bench Clerk, Translator, and finally Senior Sheristadar in 2022.

Based on a complaint, the respondents initiated departmental disciplinary proceedings and issued two charge memoranda under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, dated 7 July 2025 and 31 October 2025.

The petitioner denied the charges and challenged both charge memoranda under Article 226 of the Constitution.

During the pendency of the writ petitions, Enquiry Officers were appointed and the domestic enquiry proceedings had commenced.

The petitioner contended that the complainant had withdrawn the complaint and, therefore, the disciplinary proceedings ought not to continue.

The Court applied Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, under which disciplinary proceedings may be initiated through a charge memorandum in cases warranting a formal enquiry.

It reaffirmed the limited scope of judicial review at the stage of a charge memorandum: interference is warranted only where the charge memorandum has been issued by an incompetent or jurisdictionally unauthorised authority, or where it is vitiated by established mala fides.

An allegation of mala fides must be specifically pleaded against the concerned authority in that authority’s personal capacity and must be proved beyond doubt; mere averments or factual inferences are insufficient.

Disputed questions of fact and the merits of the charges must ordinarily be determined in the departmental enquiry, not in writ proceedings.

The petitioner’s challenge was based on the truth or falsity of the allegations and on the complainant’s subsequent withdrawal of the complaint, rather than on lack of jurisdiction, incompetence of the issuing authority, or proved mala fides.

Those matters involved disputed facts requiring consideration of documents and evidence in the domestic enquiry and could not appropriately be adjudicated in proceedings under Article 226.

Since the Enquiry Officer had already been appointed and the enquiry had commenced, the Court held that quashing the charge memoranda on merits would prematurely terminate the disciplinary process and prejudice the administration.

The petitioner remained entitled to raise all his factual and legal objections before the competent disciplinary authority during the enquiry.

Both W.P. Nos. 49930 and 49935 of 2025 were dismissed, without costs.

The petitioner was left at liberty to raise all grounds on the merits before the competent disciplinary authority in the ongoing departmental proceedings.