Writ petitions ordinarily cannot challenge Labour Court preliminary orders determining an employee’s workman status.

The petitioner, the Management of Avenue Regent, challenged Ext. P14, a preliminary order passed by the Labour Court, Ernakulam in I.D. No. 22/2016.

The Labour Court had dismissed the Management’s I.A. No. 131/2017, which sought an early determination of whether the employee, Antony Abu Franklin, was excluded from the definition of “workman” under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The Labour Court held that the employee fell within the statutory definition of “workman”.

The Management contended that the employee performed supervisory functions and received wages exceeding the prescribed statutory limit, thereby excluding him from Section 2(s).

The Union raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition challenging the preliminary order was not maintainable.

Whether a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is maintainable against a preliminary order of the Labour Court determining that an employee is a “workman” under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?

Whether the alleged lack of jurisdiction arising from the employee’s asserted exclusion from the definition of “workman” justified interference by the High Court at the preliminary stage?

Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines “workman” and determines whether an employee falls within the Labour Court’s statutory jurisdiction.

The Court applied the principle in D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration, (1983) 4 SCC 293, that Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals should ordinarily decide all issues together rather than permit preliminary objections to delay adjudication, and that High Courts should not ordinarily interfere under Article 226 at the interlocutory stage.

The Court also relied on Amrita Institute of Medical Sciences v. Labour Court, Ernakulam, 2017 (5) KHC 441, Shwas Homes Pvt. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, 2021:KER:43423, affirmed in 2022:KER:35281, and Chelamattom Sree Krishna Swami Devaswom Trust v. State of Kerala, 2022 (4) KHC 215, which applied the same rule to challenges against preliminary orders concerning workman status or the validity of a reference.

The exception recognised in St. Thomas Missions Hospital v. State of Kerala, 2007 (1) KHC 583, permits interference in appropriate cases where a preliminary order effectively terminates the proceedings or reflects a wholly misconceived exercise of jurisdiction.

The Court held that the Management’s objection regarding the employee’s status under Section 2(s) was a matter to be adjudicated in the pending industrial dispute and did not, at this stage, warrant writ interference.

Although the Management characterised the issue as one of jurisdiction, the impugned order merely rejected its preliminary objection and allowed the industrial adjudication to continue.

The Court found that the Management had reserved its right to conduct a de novo enquiry if the existing enquiry were found defective; consequently, the exceptional principle in St. Thomas Missions Hospital—where interference was justified because the preliminary order effectively concluded the proceedings—did not apply.

Following D.P. Maheshwari and the subsequent Kerala decisions, the Court prioritised expeditious resolution of the industrial dispute and held that the alleged error concerning “workman” status could be raised against the preliminary order at the appropriate stage, including along with the final award.

The Court left open all contentions of the Management concerning Ext. P14 to be raised at the appropriate stage of the proceedings.

Since the industrial dispute dated back to 2016, the Labour Court was directed to dispose of I.D. No. 22/2016 within six months from receipt of a certified copy of the judgment.