Written tenancy agreement not mandatory for eviction proceedings under U.P. Tenancy Act; Order VII Rule 11 cannot be invoked, Allahabad HC holds

Respondent No. 1, claiming to be the landlord, instituted proceedings under Section 21(2) of the U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 before the Rent Authority.

The petitioner-tenant raised a preliminary objection contending that, in the absence of a written tenancy agreement, no landlord–tenant relationship existed and the proceedings were not maintainable; he also relied on the bar under Section 38(2) of the Act.

The Rent Authority rejected the objection, holding that the statutory definition of “tenant” was sufficiently broad, that Section 4(7) permitted institution of proceedings even without the prescribed statement of information, and that the remaining objections involved disputed questions requiring adjudication on pleadings and evidence.

The Rent Tribunal held that an objection seeking threshold termination of proceedings, analogous to an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, was not maintainable under the Act. It nevertheless directed that the petitioner’s objections be treated as part of his reply and decided independently at the stage of final adjudication.

The petitioner challenged both orders under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Whether the existence of a written tenancy agreement is a jurisdictional precondition for instituting or maintaining proceedings under Section 21(2) of the U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021?

Whether an application seeking rejection or termination of proceedings at the threshold, on grounds analogous to Order VII Rule 11 CPC, is maintainable before the Rent Authority under the Act?

Whether the orders of the Rent Authority and Rent Tribunal suffered from jurisdictional infirmity, patent illegality, perversity, or material irregularity warranting interference under Article 227?

The Court applied Section 21(2) of the U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021, holding that it creates a substantive statutory remedy for eviction and does not require the tenancy to be evidenced by a written agreement.

The Court relied on Section 4(7), which permits institution of proceedings despite the absence of the prescribed statement of information, and distinguished statutory jurisdiction from proof of the facts necessary to obtain relief.

Section 33, which excludes the application of the Code of Civil Procedure except as otherwise provided by the Act, was read with Section 34, which confers only specified civil-court-like procedural powers; consequently, Order VII Rule 11 CPC cannot be imported into proceedings under the Act.

The Court further held that Section 38(2) excludes adjudication of title-related questions but does not oust the Rent Authority’s jurisdiction to entertain eviction proceedings.

It also followed Akhilesh Kumar v. Sanjay Sahgal, 2026 (7) ADJ 205, which held that absence of a written tenancy agreement neither renders proceedings under Section 21(2) non-maintainable nor deprives the Rent Authority of jurisdiction.

The Court held that the Rent Authority’s jurisdiction flows from the Act itself, not from the existence of a written tenancy agreement.

Whether the parties had a landlord–tenant relationship, and what the terms of that relationship were, constituted jurisdictional facts and merits-based questions for determination by the Rent Authority; they did not affect its inherent jurisdiction.

Treating the written agreement as a jurisdictional precondition would permit a party to defeat the statutory forum merely by disputing the tenancy document.

On procedure, the Court noted that the Act establishes a self-contained, summary, and time-bound mechanism based on an application, notice, reply, rejoinder where necessary, and summary enquiry.

Since Section 33 excludes the CPC and Section 34 incorporates only limited procedural powers, Order VII Rule 11 could not be used to secure threshold rejection of the eviction proceedings.

However, exclusion of that procedural mechanism did not extinguish the petitioner’s substantive defences. His objections concerning maintainability, jurisdiction, limitation, and the existence of the tenancy relationship remained available and were required to be considered at final adjudication.

Finding no jurisdictional infirmity, patent illegality, perversity, or material irregularity in the impugned orders, the Court dismissed the Article 227 petition.

It clarified that the dismissal would not prejudice the petitioner’s right to raise all available factual and legal objections before the Rent Authority; those objections were to be treated as part of his reply and decided independently on their merits, uninfluenced by the earlier orders or the judgment, except for the legal principles stated therein.