₹25 Lakh Trap Catches Intermediary, But Karnataka HC Quashes FIR Against Public Servant, Finding No Evidence He Demanded or Accepted Bribe

The complainant, a real-estate developer, alleged that the petitioner, a public official involved in processing a proposal concerning Transferable Development Rights (TDR), demanded a bribe in connection with the proposal.

The complaint referred to an initial demand of ₹45 lakh, allegedly reduced to ₹25 lakh.

The Lokayukta registered Crime No. 3 of 2024 under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and laid a trap.

The complainant handed ₹25 lakh to accused No. 2, who was apprehended at the scene; the petitioner was elsewhere and was also taken into custody.

The petitioner sought quashing of the FIR, contending that he had neither demanded nor accepted the money.

The State and complainant maintained that accused No. 2 had accepted it on the petitioner’s instructions.

Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, read with Explanation 2, covers obtaining or accepting an undue advantage directly or through a third party, including for another person.

The prosecution must nevertheless establish the foundational facts connecting the public servant to the transaction: demand and acceptance or obtainment, which may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence; mere recovery from an intermediary does not by itself establish the public servant’s guilt.

The Court relied on Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 280), which explains proof of demand and acceptance and the operation of the Section 20 presumption; Soundarajan v. State, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 424; and Bharat Raj Meena v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1904, which states that third-party receipt does not automatically impose criminal liability and that the intermediary’s authority, direction, or connection to the accused must be established.

The Court also applied the quashing principles in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, including where the allegations and material do not prima facie make out an offence.

The Court accepted that Section 7(a) can reach a transaction conducted through an intermediary, but held that the prosecution must produce reliable material attributing the demand and the intermediary’s receipt to the accused public servant.

Although the complaint alleged a demand by the petitioner, the Court considered the trap material and the conversation relied upon to concern accused No. 2; the petitioner was not the person trapped, no trap or pre-trap mahazar was conducted against him, and there was no phenolphthalein evidence implicating him.

In the Court’s view, accused No. 2’s statement that he received the money on the petitioner’s instructions, without supporting material linking the petitioner to the demand and acceptance, was insufficient to continue the investigation against the petitioner.

The Court therefore found that the foundational material required to sustain the Section 7(a) allegation was absent and that permitting the proceedings to continue would amount to an abuse of process.

It allowed the criminal petition and quashed the FIR in Crime No. 3 of 2024 qua the petitioner, while the order did not purport to quash the proceedings against accused No. 2.