A belated title-declaration amendment cannot circumvent limitation after the granted amendment period expires.

The petitioner’s suit for permanent injunction, based on a claim of ownership, was dismissed.

In the appeal, the petitioner sought to amend the plaint to challenge as forged a Power of Attorney dated 26 December 1997 and to challenge the Sale Deed dated 10 December 1999 executed under it.

That amendment application, I.A. No. 3 of 2023, followed an earlier High Court order granting liberty to amend the plaint to include declaratory relief within sixty days.

While I.A. No. 3 of 2023 was pending, the petitioner filed I.A. No. 5 of 2025 seeking a further amendment to add a declaration of title and the corresponding valuation and court fee.

The Sub Court dismissed both applications.

The petitioner challenged those orders under Article 227 of the Constitution.

1. Whether the petitioner could introduce a declaration of title through I.A. No. 5 of 2025 by treating it as supplementary to I.A. No. 3 of 2023, despite the delay and the terms of the earlier order granting liberty to amend.

2. Whether the proposed declaratory relief was prima facie barred by limitation, warranting refusal of the amendment.

3. Whether the Sub Court’s orders disclosed an illegality, infirmity or perversity justifying interference under Article 227.

Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure governs amendments to pleadings; the court considered the proposed amendment in light of the petitioner’s delay and the earlier, time-limited liberty to amend.

The judgment identified Article 58 of the Limitation Act as prescribing three years for a declaration from when the right to sue first accrues; Article 56 as prescribing three years for a declaration that an instrument is forged from when its issue or registration becomes known; and Article 59 as prescribing three years for cancellation or setting aside an instrument from when the relevant facts become known.

Article 227 of the Constitution provides the supervisory jurisdiction invoked in the revisions, and the Court’s stated inquiry was whether the Sub Court’s orders warranted such intervention.

The petitioner cited Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan, Sajjan Kumar v. Ram Kishan, and Pankaja v. Yellappa in support of a liberal approach to amendments, but the Court’s decision rested on its assessment of the delay, limitation and the earlier order’s terms.

The Court treated the title declaration sought in I.A. No. 5 of 2025 as a substantive relief, not merely a supplement to the earlier application seeking declarations concerning the Power of Attorney and Sale Deed.

The petitioner knew of the rival title claim and the registered documents relied upon by the defendant, yet had originally sought only an injunction; the Court also found that the petitioner had not availed the earlier liberty to amend in the stipulated manner and time.

Given the substantial delay and the Court’s view that the proposed relief was prima facie time-barred, it rejected the argument that I.A. No. 5 of 2025 should be treated as a continuation of I.A. No. 3 of 2023.

It found no basis for supervisory interference with the Sub Court’s orders.

Both civil revision petitions were dismissed, with no order as to costs; the connected miscellaneous petitions were closed.