A child witness’s testimony remains admissible without formal competency testing if she understands questions and gives rational answers.

The appellant was tried for the murders of Mali Pradhan and Suraj Pradhan. The prosecution alleged that, on 23 November 2010, following a matrimonial dispute involving the informant and the appellant’s sister, the appellant took Mali and Suraj from village Alimaha towards his village by deceit and force while carrying an axe. He allegedly assaulted Mali with the axe near his house and thereafter assaulted Suraj in a mustard field when Suraj attempted to flee. Both died from their injuries.

PW-3, a young daughter of the informant, claimed to have witnessed the occurrence, while PWs-4 and 5 provided corroborative ocular evidence; a blood-stained axe was also allegedly recovered from the appellant.

The Sessions Court convicted the appellant under Sections 364 and 302 IPC and imposed concurrent sentences of ten years’ rigorous imprisonment for Section 364 and life imprisonment for Section 302, along with fines. The appellant challenged the conviction in appeal.

Whether the deaths of Mali and Suraj were homicidal and whether the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant caused their deaths by assaulting them with an axe.

Whether the testimony of PW-3, a young witness, was legally competent and sufficiently reliable despite the absence of a separately recorded competency finding, delayed disclosure, and omission of her position from the spot map.

Whether the discrepancies between the ocular testimony and the medical evidence, and the variations among PWs-3, 4 and 5, were material enough to create reasonable doubt.

Whether the evidence established the ingredients of kidnapping or abduction for murder under Section 364 IPC.

The Court applied Sections 302 and 364 IPC. Section 302 concerns culpable homicide amounting to murder, while Section 364 requires proof that the victim was kidnapped or abducted with the purpose that the victim be murdered or be placed in danger of being murdered.

Under Section 118 of the Evidence Act, a witness is competent if capable of understanding questions and giving rational answers; age alone does not disqualify a witness.

Relying on Panchhi v. State of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 177, and Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka, (2001) 9 SCC 129, the Court held that child testimony must be scrutinised with care but may independently support conviction if it inspires confidence.

Under Inder Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), (1978) 4 SCC 161, evidence is to be assessed holistically and minor investigative omissions or discrepancies are not necessarily fatal.

Under Badshah v. State of U.P., (2008) 3 SCC 681, the purpose behind kidnapping or abduction may be inferred from the circumstances before, during and after the taking.

Section 106 of the Evidence Act may provide an additional link once the prosecution establishes foundational facts, though it does not shift the prosecution’s primary burden.

The post-mortem evidence established that both deceased sustained ante-mortem, multiple head and chest injuries sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death, and that the injuries could have been caused by the seized axe.

PW-3 was approximately 15–16 years old, but her deposition and cross-examination showed that she understood the questions and gave rational answers; hence, the absence of a formal competency inquiry did not affect admissibility.

Her delayed disclosure was reasonably explained by her fear, return journey through a forested route, and the fact that she narrated the incident when her father returned at about 4 p.m.

The omission of her position from the spot map was treated as an investigative lapse rather than proof of absence.

The variations concerning the precise location, number and sequence of axe blows were considered natural, particularly because the witnesses were rustic villagers, and did not undermine the consistent core of the prosecution case: the appellant took both deceased towards his village and assaulted them with an axe.

PWs-4 and 5 independently placed the appellant with the deceased at the relevant time and corroborated the assault, while the recovery of the blood-stained axe and the medical evidence provided further support.

For Section 364 IPC, the Court held that the appellant’s false representation concerning the informant’s whereabouts, the pushing or inducement of the deceased to accompany him, his possession of an axe, and the immediate subsequent murders established that the taking was by deceit and force and was connected with a murderous design.

The appellant’s failure to explain the presence and deaths of the victims in or near his village constituted an additional circumstance under Section 106 of the Evidence Act.

The conviction and sentences imposed by the Sessions Court were affirmed, and the appeal was dismissed.

As the appellant was on bail, his bail bond was directed to be cancelled and he was ordered to be taken into custody to serve the remaining sentence.

The Court also directed the Odisha State Legal Services Authority to pay the appointed Amicus Curiae a professional fee of Rs.15,000.