A civil property dispute alone does not justify denying anticipatory bail.

The petitioners sought anticipatory bail in FIR No. 109/2025 registered at Police Station Saket, South Delhi, for offences under Sections 420, 468, 471 and 34 of the IPC.

The complainant alleged that she had obtained a loan of ₹25,00,000 from the petitioners by transferring her flat through a registered sale deed, while the parties’ subsequent MoUs contemplated repayment of the loan and re-transfer of the flat to her.

She claimed to have repaid ₹13,77,000, but alleged that the petitioners instead sold the flat to third parties.

The complainant had also instituted a civil suit for specific performance in 2022.

In that suit, the petitioners relied upon photocopies of MoUs dated 4 July 2017 and 16 September 2020 and asserted that the originals were in the complainant’s possession.

The complainant opposed anticipatory bail, arguing that the original MoUs had not been produced for forensic examination and that custodial interrogation was necessary.

Whether the petitioners were entitled to anticipatory bail in the FIR alleging cheating, forgery and use of forged documents under Sections 420, 468, 471 and 34 IPC?

Whether custodial interrogation was justified merely because the original MoUs had not been handed over to the Investigating Officer for forensic examination?

Whether the dispute, arising from a registered sale deed, subsequent MoUs and an alleged obligation to re-transfer the flat, was predominantly civil in nature so as to warrant protection from arrest?

The Court considered the allegations under Sections 420, 468, 471 and 34 IPC, concerning cheating, forgery, use of forged documents and common intention.

It applied the principle that anticipatory bail cannot be denied merely on the Investigating Officer’s assertion that custodial interrogation is required; the Investigating Officer must demonstrate a rational and justified necessity for such interrogation.

The Court further applied the principle that where the underlying dispute is essentially civil in nature and civil proceedings concerning the same transaction are already pending, deprivation of personal liberty through arrest is not ordinarily justified merely by giving the dispute a criminal colour.

The Court also noted, for the limited purpose of anticipatory bail, the prima facie distinction between a registered sale deed and an unregistered MoU relied upon to challenge or qualify that transaction.

The Court found that the prosecution’s allegation regarding the location of the original MoUs did not establish a sound basis for custodial interrogation.

The petitioners had consistently asserted in the civil proceedings that the originals were with the complainant, and the Court considered this plausible because the complainant admittedly possessed the original MoU dated 4 July 2017 and, if seeking re-transfer of the flat, would naturally be expected to retain the relevant documents.

Since the alleged originals were not shown to be in the petitioners’ possession, their arrest for the purpose of recovery or forensic examination was not justified merely on the Investigating Officer’s request.

Further, the flat had been transferred to the petitioners through a registered sale deed, with no mortgage deed having been executed, while the complainant relied upon an unregistered MoU to assert a contrary arrangement.

The Court therefore formed a prima facie view that the dispute was substantially civil and was already the subject of a civil suit for specific performance.

The Court expressly clarified that these observations were confined to the question of anticipatory bail and would not bind the trial court at the final stage.

It directed that, in the event of arrest, each petitioner be released on bail upon furnishing a personal bond of ₹50,000 with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the concerned Investigating Officer or Station House Officer.

The Court’s observations regarding the civil nature of the dispute and the absence of a justified need for custodial interrogation were expressly limited to the adjudication of anticipatory bail and were not to influence the trial court’s independent assessment on the merits.