A Commissioner may review Section 229-B appellate orders only within Order XLVII’s strict limits.

Respondent no. 3 brought a suit under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, claiming rights in land under a registered sale deed executed pursuant to a power of attorney. The trial court dismissed the suit while a civil suit challenging the power of attorney and sale deed was pending; the Commissioner dismissed the appeal against that decision.

Respondent no. 3 later obtained review of the Commissioner’s order, relying, among other things, on the fact that the civil suit had been dismissed for want of prosecution and its restoration application rejected. The suit was restored and subsequently decreed; the Board of Revenue dismissed the petitioners’ revision against the review order as infructuous because the suit had meanwhile been decided.

The petitioners challenged the review order, the consequential decree and the Board’s order.

1. Whether the Commissioner had statutory authority to review its appellate order in a Section 229-B proceeding.

2. Whether the Commissioner’s order allowing review satisfied the requirements and limits of review under Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

3. Whether the later trial-court decree and the Board’s dismissal of the revision as infructuous could stand after the review order was challenged.

Section 341 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 makes the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings under the Act, subject to the Act and its Rules; Rule 339 of the 1952 Rules, read with Section 274 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, provides a statutory basis for review by courts other than the Board in proceedings to which the rule applies.

Under Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, review is confined to recognised grounds, including discovery of new and important matter or evidence despite due diligence, an error apparent on the face of the record, or another legally sufficient reason; review cannot serve as an appeal or rehearing on the merits.

The authority allowing review must address the applicable statutory conditions and follow the procedure under Order XLVII, including Rule 4.

A subsequent decision made pursuant to a challenged remand or restoration order does not, by itself, render the challenge to that underlying order infructuous.

The Court held that this appeal arose from a Section 229-B suit within Schedule II and was therefore governed by Rule 339 and Section 274; accordingly, the Commissioner had jurisdiction to entertain review, notwithstanding the petitioners’ reliance on Ulfat.

But jurisdiction did not establish that review was properly allowed. The cited dismissal and restoration orders in the separate civil suit predated the 2021 appellate order by several years. The Commissioner therefore had to assess the respondent’s explanation for not producing them earlier and determine whether due diligence was satisfied. The review order did not demonstrate that those requirements, or the applicable Order XLVII procedure, had been met; the Court accordingly set it aside and remitted the review application for fresh consideration.

Because the trial-court decree followed solely from restoration under that review order, the decree could not stand independently once the restoration order was quashed. The Board also erred in treating the revision as infructuous merely because a fresh decree had been passed.

The consequential decree dated 24 October 2025 and the Board’s order dated 20 April 2026 were also set aside; no separate remand of the revision to the Board was ordered.

The petitioners’ appeal against the decree was to be disposed of as infructuous, without a decision on its merits; the Court expressed no opinion on the merits of the original suit or the review application.