A coordinator’s designation alone does not establish Section 75’s actual-charge-or-control requirement.

The petitioner, a Nursery-to-Class-II coordinator at DAV Public School, was accused of keeping a five-year-old UKG pupil outside the classroom and denying the child drinking water and washroom access because of unpaid school fees.

The child’s parent complained to the school and later to the police.

A school committee did not substantiate the allegations.

The petitioner was charged under Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, and sought to quash the proceedings under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Whether the material on record prima facie established that the petitioner had the actual charge of, or control over, the child, as required by Section 75 of the Act.

Whether, in the absence of such material and in light of the investigation and other circumstances, continuation of the prosecution amounted to an abuse of process warranting quashing.

Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Act applies where a person having the actual charge of or control over a child assaults, abandons, abuses, exposes, or wilfully neglects the child—or causes such conduct—in a manner likely to cause unnecessary mental or physical suffering.

The requisite relationship of charge or control and the specified conduct are essential statutory ingredients; a person’s designation alone does not establish them.

In S.C. Narang v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 INSC 688, the Supreme Court held that management responsibility over a school does not, without more, establish actual charge of or control over every child attending it.

The Court distinguished Smti Sane Concieta B. Sangma v. State of Meghalaya, Crl. P. No. 73 of 2023 (31 January 2024), as concerning discipline of a pupil by a teacher.

The Court found that the petitioner’s role as coordinator did not, without supporting material, establish that she had actual charge of or control over the child within Section 75.

The charge sheet identified no independent witness or school staff member examined to corroborate the allegations; while that omission alone was not decisive, the Court considered it alongside the absence of prima facie material establishing the statutory ingredients.

The school committee’s findings were not conclusive of criminal liability but were treated as a relevant circumstance.

Applying the principle in S.C. Narang, the Court concluded that the petitioner’s designation could not substitute for proof of the required charge-or-control relationship.

It allowed the petition and quashed the proceedings against the petitioner in C.C. No. 1277 of 2026; pending miscellaneous applications were closed.