A daughter-in-law’s shared-household residence right is not indefeasible after the owner withdraws permission.

The respondent-plaintiff, Chand Babu, was the owner of House No. 201, Ground Floor, MIG Flats, Jahangir Puri, Delhi, as evidenced by the allotment letter and payment receipt.

After the marriage of his son, Brij Raj, with Renu Raj on 28 January 2012, he permitted both appellants—his son and daughter-in-law—to reside in one room of the property out of love and affection.

Alleging that their conduct subsequently became hostile and disrespectful and that they threatened to dispossess him, Chand Babu terminated their permissive occupation by legal notice dated 13 July 2015.

He thereafter instituted a suit for permanent and mandatory injunction seeking possession and occupation charges of ₹5,000 per month.

The appellants claimed that Renu Raj had paid ₹2 lakhs towards purchase of the property and that Brij Raj had contributed substantially to its maintenance, thereby acquiring an ownership or co-sharer interest.

They also claimed a right of residence in the property as a shared household.

The Trial Court decreed mandatory injunction directing delivery of vacant possession but denied damages; the First Appellate Court affirmed the decree.

The appellants preferred the present second appeal under Section 100 CPC.

Whether the appellants had any legal or proprietary right to continue occupying the respondent’s property after termination of their permissive occupation?

Whether the daughter-in-law possessed an indefeasible right of residence in the property as a “shared household,” notwithstanding the respondent’s ownership and withdrawal of permission?

Whether the second appeal raised any substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 CPC?

The Court applied Section 100 CPC, under which a second appeal lies only where a substantial question of law arises.

It applied the principle that a son and daughter-in-law permitted to reside in the property of the owner out of love and affection acquire no independent legal right to continue there once such permission is withdrawn, particularly where no ownership or co-ownership is proved.

Relying on Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi, the Court recognized that a daughter-in-law may have a right to reside in a shared household even without title or ownership.

However, relying on Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja, (2021) 1 SCC 414, it held that such right is not indefeasible and that dispossession must be effected in accordance with law.

The Court also applied the evidentiary principle that an assertion of contribution towards purchase or ownership, unsupported by evidence, cannot establish a proprietary interest.

The respondent’s ownership was supported by the allotment letter and payment receipt, while the appellants led no evidence despite repeated opportunities to substantiate their alleged payment of ₹2 lakhs or contribution towards the property.

Their occupation was therefore permissive and not founded on ownership, co-ownership, or any proved contractual right.

Although the Court acknowledged the daughter-in-law’s potential statutory right to reside in a shared household under the principles discussed in Prabha Tyagi and Satish Chander Ahuja, it clarified that the right was not indefeasible.

In the present case, the owner had expressly withdrawn permission through the legal notice, and the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court established that the appellants had no right to continue in possession.

The appellants’ challenge merely sought reconsideration of factual findings and did not disclose any substantial question of law under Section 100 CPC.

The daughter-in-law’s shared-household right was not treated as an indefeasible right overriding the owner’s entitlement to seek possession through lawful proceedings.

Finding no substantial question of law, the Court dismissed RSA 185/2024 and upheld the decree directing the appellants to hand over peaceful vacant possession.

The claim for occupation charges had already been rejected by the Trial Court, and the pending applications were disposed of accordingly.