A disciplinary dismissal is unsustainable when mandatory procedural safeguards and enquiry-report disclosure are violated.

The petitioner, appointed as a Junior Engineer in 1979, was transferred from the Flood Control Division, Siwan, to the Water Drainage Division, Masrakh, and was relieved on 4 September 1996.

He submitted his joining at the transferred post on 6 September 1996, but contended that the authorities failed to take over charge from him and stopped payment of his salary.

The petitioner later submitted his joining on 14 December 2006. Instead of accepting it, the Department initiated disciplinary proceedings in 2008 for unauthorised absence, indiscipline and misconduct.

He was dismissed retrospectively with effect from 6 March 1996 by order dated 29 December 2009.

In an earlier writ petition, the High Court set aside the appellate order and remanded the matter for fresh consideration.

Whether the disciplinary proceedings were vitiated by non-compliance with Rules 17(3)–(6) of the Bihar Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005, particularly by failure of the disciplinary authority to obtain and consider the petitioner’s written statement of defence before appointing the Enquiry Officer?

Whether the proceedings were vitiated because the enquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner before the disciplinary authority passed the order of punishment?

Whether the disciplinary authority violated Rule 18(4) of the Bihar CCA Rules, 2005 by mechanically rejecting the petitioner’s reply to the second show-cause notice without considering its contents?

Whether the petitioner could be punished on the basis of Rule 76 of the Bihar Service Code when the alleged violation of that provision was not part of the original charge?

Whether dismissal could lawfully be made effective retrospectively from a date prior to the order of dismissal?

Whether dismissal from service was disproportionate to the misconduct alleged, particularly in the absence of corruption, moral turpitude, misappropriation or proved financial loss?

The Court applied Rules 17(3)–(6) of the Bihar CCA Rules, 2005, which require the disciplinary authority to frame and serve the charge, obtain the delinquent employee’s written statement of defence, apply its mind to the defence, and only thereafter decide whether an enquiry is necessary.

Rule 18(3) requires supply of the enquiry report, while Rule 18(4) mandates consideration of the employee’s representation before imposition of punishment.

The Court relied on Rama Shankar Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, 2018 (1) PLJR 91, and Shweta Mishra v. State of Bihar, 2018 (1) PLJR 784, regarding mandatory procedural safeguards.

The Court relied on State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772, and Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570, regarding the Enquiry Officer’s impartiality and the requirement that documentary evidence be properly proved.

The Court relied on State Bank of India v. Kamal Kishore Prasad, 2018 (1) PLJR 893, regarding the impermissibility of retrospective dismissal.

The Court relied on Ravi Oraon v. State of Jharkhand, AIR 2025 SC 5073, regarding punishment based on a charge different from the one notified.

Krushankant B. Parmar v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 178, holding that unauthorised absence is not necessarily wilful absence and that wilfulness must be established.

The Court also applied the proportionality principle in disciplinary punishment and relied on Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewary, (2017) 2 SCC 308, permitting the Court, in appropriate cases involving long delay and supervening circumstances, not to remit a procedurally defective enquiry for fresh proceedings.

The Court found that the disciplinary authority had not first called for and considered the petitioner’s written statement of defence as required by Rules 17(4) and 17(5) of the Bihar CCA Rules, 2005.

Instead, the charge memorandum itself appointed the Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer, and the Enquiry Officer improperly called upon the petitioner to submit his defence.

The Court further noted that the departmental documents had not been proved through witnesses and that the enquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner before the punishment order, contrary to Rule 18(3).

The punishment order also failed to demonstrate consideration of the petitioner’s reply to the second show-cause notice, thereby violating Rule 18(4).

Further, the disciplinary authority relied on Rule 76 of the Bihar Service Code even though the petitioner had not originally been charged with violation of that provision, resulting in punishment on a ground for which he had not been given an effective opportunity to defend himself.

The Court additionally held that dismissal could not be given retrospective effect from 6 March or 6 September 1996.

Although the Court noted that the petitioner had not produced comprehensive medical records substantiating his alleged ten-year treatment, it found that the proceedings were fundamentally defective.

The alleged misconduct concerned absence from duty and did not involve corruption, moral turpitude, misappropriation, illegal gratification or proved financial loss.

In these circumstances, and considering the petitioner’s long service, the extreme penalty of dismissal was also disproportionate.

In view of the petitioner’s age, his superannuation in 2016, and the prolonged pendency of the litigation, the Court held that remitting the matter for a fresh enquiry would cause undue hardship and was unnecessary.

It declined to remit the matter for a fresh disciplinary enquiry because of the substantial delay, the petitioner’s advanced age and the fact that he had already reached the age of superannuation.

The respondents were directed to grant the petitioner all consequential service and retiral benefits.

However, no salary was awarded for the period of absence from 6 September 1996 during which the petitioner claimed to have been under treatment, in the absence of adequate supporting medical records.

The petitioner was awarded 50% salary from 14 December 2006, when he claimed to have submitted his joining, until the date of superannuation, along with pension and other post-retirement benefits.

The directions were to be implemented within four months.