A disciplinary finding based on no evidence is perverse and cannot sustain dismissal.

Surendra Prasad was appointed as a Typist-cum-Stenographer in the office of the Desi Chikitsa Officer, Rohtas, on 15 December 1987.

In 2000, he appeared as a witness before the Munsif, Bikramganj, in Title Suit No. 55 of 1997, allegedly against the interests of the State and without prior departmental permission.

He was suspended on 15 January 2004 and served with a charge-sheet dated 16 February 2004 containing ten charges, including giving evidence against the Government, misrepresenting his designation and parentage, fabricating documents, threatening a Government counsel, and improperly drawing salary.

The Enquiry Officer submitted a report dated 15 May 2004 holding the charges proved, principally on the ground that the respondent’s defence was vague and that he had not produced evidence in his defence.

After a second show-cause notice, the disciplinary authority dismissed him from service on 16 April 2005.

His departmental appeal was rejected on 11 November 2009 without adequate reasoning.

The respondent challenged both orders in CWJC No. 7643 of 2010. The learned Single Judge quashed the dismissal and appellate orders and directed settlement of his service and monetary benefits within three months.

Whether the departmental enquiry and the Enquiry Officer’s report were sustainable when no departmental witness was examined and no documentary evidence was proved to establish the charges?

Whether the disciplinary authority could impose the penalty of dismissal on the basis of an enquiry report founded on surmises, the respondent’s failure to adduce defence evidence, and without properly considering his reply?

Whether the appellate order dated 11 November 2009 was legally sustainable in the absence of adequate reasons?

Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in quashing the dismissal and appellate orders and directing settlement of the respondent’s service and monetary benefits?

The disciplinary proceeding was conducted under Rule 55 of the Bihar Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules.

The Court applied the principle that a departmental enquiry is quasi-judicial and that findings of guilt must be based on material and evidence brought on record, not merely on allegations, conjectures, or the delinquent’s failure to prove his innocence.

Relying on Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570, the Court held that documents and allegations must be proved in the enquiry and that suspicion cannot substitute for evidence.

Under Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10, findings based on no evidence or findings which no reasonable person could reach are perverse and amenable to judicial review.

The Court also relied on the principles stated in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772, and other cited authorities, that disciplinary and appellate authorities must apply their minds and provide reasons where serious civil consequences follow.

The Court found that the Department had not examined even a single witness and had not produced or proved the alleged deposition, affidavit, fabricated documents, or any material demonstrating that the respondent intended to benefit the plaintiffs or caused loss to the Government.

The Enquiry Officer nevertheless treated the charges as proved, substantially because the respondent’s defence was allegedly vague and because he had not produced evidence in his own support.

The Court held that this approach reversed the proper burden in a disciplinary enquiry and rendered the report one based on hypothetical reasoning and no evidence.

Since the enquiry report was legally unsustainable, the dismissal order, which mechanically relied upon it and failed to consider the respondent’s reply to the second show-cause notice, was also vitiated.

The appellate order independently failed because it contained no meaningful reasons and did not properly reconsider the respondent’s challenge.

Judicial interference was therefore justified under the limited but established exception permitting review of perverse findings based on no evidence.

The Court found no infirmity in the learned Single Judge’s judgment dated 12 October 2022, which had quashed both orders and directed the authorities to settle the respondent’s service and monetary benefits within three months.

The Letters Patent Appeal was accordingly dismissed.