A donor-parent may validly accept a gift on behalf of a minor donee.

Hira Lall acquired various properties, including the residential property in dispute. The plaintiff, Ratan Lall, was born from Hira Lall’s second marriage. Hira Lall allegedly executed a deed of gift dated 11 December 1956 in favour of the plaintiff, who was then a minor. The deed was presented for registration on 13 March 1957, but was impounded for deficit stamp duty, which was subsequently paid. The plaintiff claimed that the deed was thereafter registered and that he became the owner of the property; alternatively, he claimed title by adverse possession.

The defendants, who were members of Hira Lall’s family and occupants of portions of the premises, disputed the plaintiff’s title. They contended that the property was joint family or ancestral property, that the gift deed was invalid and had not been acted upon, and that the plaintiff could not seek eviction without establishing a legally recognised ground under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982.

The plaintiff instituted eviction and title proceedings against the defendants. The trial court decreed the suit in his favour on 21 June 2005. The first appellate court dismissed the defendants’ appeals and affirmed the decree. The defendants thereafter preferred the present second appeals.

The appeals were heard together because they arose between the same parties and concerned the same subject matter.

Whether the deed of gift dated 11 December 1956 could be admitted in evidence and could validly convey title to the plaintiff despite the alleged non-compliance with Sections 60 and 61 of the Registration Act?

Whether a deed of gift executed by a donor in favour of a minor is valid where the donor himself accepts the gift on behalf of the minor donee?

The Court applied Sections 58–61 of the Registration Act concerning endorsements, certification and completion of registration, and referred to Section 87 concerning the effect of errors or omissions by registering officers.

The Court treated the requirements relating to acts performed by the registering authority as directory where the essential statutory requirements had otherwise been fulfilled, relying on Hirendra Narayan Singh v. Jung Bahadur Singh, AIR 1952 Patna 265.

On acceptance of gifts by or on behalf of minors, the Court relied on Ponnuchami Servai v. Bala Subramaniam, AIR 1982 Mad 281, and K. Balakrishnan v. K. Kamalam, (2004) 1 SCC 581, which establish that a gift to a minor may be accepted by the minor’s natural guardian and that, particularly where the donor is the parent or guardian, acceptance may be presumed from the circumstances.

The Court also considered the principles governing reasoned first appellate judgments under Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as explained in U. Manjunath Rao v. U. Chandrashekhar and Union of India v. Ranchhod.

The Court examined the gift deed and found that it had been executed by Hira Lall during his lifetime, that the deficit stamp duty and penalty had been paid, and that the deed was subsequently registered.

It held that the requirements of the Registration Act had therefore been substantially complied with and that any omission in recording the document in the registration records was an administrative or curable defect that could not defeat the plaintiff’s title.

The Court further held that the plaintiff’s minority did not invalidate the gift. Since the donor was the plaintiff’s father and natural guardian, acceptance could be made on behalf of the minor or presumed from the circumstances. The plaintiff’s subsequent conduct and the fact that the gift was acted upon supported acceptance.

The Court consequently found no legal error in the concurrent findings of the courts below.

It held that the deed of gift was validly registered and capable of conveying title to the plaintiff, and that acceptance of the gift on behalf of the minor donee by the donor-father did not invalidate the transaction.

Both second appeals were dismissed on contest, with no order as to costs. The trial court record was directed to be returned to the court below.