A dying declaration cannot sustain conviction when material inconsistencies undermine its reliability.

The State appealed under Sections 378(1) and 378(3) CrPC against the acquittal of the respondents of charges under Sections 302/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act.

The prosecution alleged that the deceased was shot while returning home, following an exhortation by one accused; his fardbeyan was recorded at hospital, and he later died while being taken to Patna.

At trial, the prosecution examined 13 witnesses and relied on the fardbeyan, medical evidence and other exhibits; the trial court acquitted the accused, citing inconsistencies concerning the place and manner of occurrence and failure to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt.

1. Whether the prosecution established the alleged place of occurrence.

2. Whether the alleged manner of occurrence was doubtful.

3. Whether the deceased’s fardbeyan, as a dying declaration, established guilt beyond reasonable doubt despite material inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence.

4. Whether the trial court’s acquittal warranted appellate interference.

Sections 302/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act were the offences charged, and the appeal was brought under Sections 378(1) and 378(3) CrPC.

The Court relied on Syed Ibrahim v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2006) 10 SCC 601, for the principle that the prosecution version should not be accepted where the place of occurrence is not established.

Krishnegowda v. State of Karnataka, (2017) 13 SCC 98, on the significance of contradictions between medical and ocular evidence and the resulting benefit of doubt.

Irfan v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1060, for the rule that a dying declaration must be truthful and reliable, and that material doubts may require corroboration before conviction.

Under Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 10 SCC 450, and Muralidhar @ Gidda v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 730, an acquittal should not be disturbed where the trial court’s view is reasonable; the acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence, and a possible view should stand.

The Court found that the fardbeyan placed the occurrence in front of the deceased’s house, while witnesses located it near Shailendra Kumar’s house and the investigating officer described a lane there; deficiencies in the investigation further left the situs uncertain.

It also found a material conflict between the account that the deceased was shot from behind and the doctor’s evidence that the injury was sustained from the front.

Given these inconsistencies, the fardbeyan did not inspire sufficient confidence as a dying declaration, and there was no reliable corroboration to overcome the resulting doubt.

The trial court’s acquittal was therefore a reasonable view of the evidence and did not meet the threshold for appellate interference.

Finding no basis to interfere with the acquittal, it dismissed the State’s appeal at the admission stage; any pending applications were also disposed of.