A High Court cannot quash criminal proceedings under Article 226 after cognizance is taken.

The petitioners challenged Lake Town P.S. Case No. 247 of 2021, arising from a demonstration against alleged irregularities in School Service Commission recruitment.

The FIR alleged that the petitioners and others gathered in breach of COVID-19 restrictions, obstructed traffic, and violated prohibitory measures.

A charge-sheet was filed against the petitioners under Sections 188, 269, 270, 271 and 283 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with Section 51(b) of the Disaster Management Act, 2005; the Magistrate took cognizance while the Article 226 petition was pending.

The petitioners sought to be removed from the records of the criminal case, alleging mala fides and violations of constitutional rights.

1. Whether a petition under Article 226 seeking to quash a criminal proceeding remains maintainable after a charge-sheet has been filed and the Magistrate has taken cognizance.

2. Whether the Court could treat the Article 226 petition as one under Article 227 or the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction despite the petition’s form and the relevant judicial assignment.

Under Neeta Singh v. State of U.P., (2026) 6 SCC 817, when a competent criminal court takes cognizance during the pendency of an Article 226 petition challenging an FIR, the intervening judicial order disables the High Court from proceeding with that writ petition; the inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, may nevertheless remain available.

Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423, establishes that judicial orders of subordinate courts are not amenable to Article 226 writ jurisdiction and may instead be challenged through the appropriate appellate, revisional or supervisory route.

As explained in Neeta Singh, a judge assigned Article 226 matters cannot simply convert and determine a petition as one under Article 227 unless that jurisdiction has also been assigned to that judge.

Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra, (2026) 6 SCC 813, and Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 INSC 1249, were also relied on for the distinction between Article 226 jurisdiction and the High Court’s inherent power: after cognizance, the appropriate remedy is an application invoking inherent jurisdiction, not an Article 226 petition.

The petition challenged the criminal proceeding under Article 226, but the Magistrate had taken cognizance before the writ petition was disposed of.

Applying Neeta Singh and the related authorities, the Court held that the intervening judicial order prevented it from proceeding with the Article 226 petition.

It declined to convert the petition into one under Article 227 or to consider the merits of the allegations.

The petitioners’ claims that the protest was peaceful, that no offence was disclosed, and that the prosecution was mala fide were left open for the appropriate proceeding.

The dismissal does not preclude the petitioners from challenging the charge-sheet and cognizance order through an appropriate application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, as applicable, or from seeking discharge at the appropriate stage.

The Court expressed no view on the merits and made no order as to costs.