A Land Tribunal order is void unless signed by every member who heard the case.

The appellants claimed succession to and possession of lands bearing R.S. No. 259/1 measuring 10 acres 34 guntas and R.S. No. 259/2 measuring 11 acres at Devagiri village, Haveri Taluk.

Respondents 3 and 4 filed applications in Form No. 7 claiming occupancy rights as tenants of the respective lands.

Their claims were initially rejected, but their writ petitions were allowed and the matters were remanded to the Land Tribunal for fresh consideration.

On 30 January 2013, the Land Tribunal granted occupancy rights in favour of respondents 3 and 4.

The appellants challenged that order in W.P. No. 79389 of 2013.

The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on 23 November 2022, holding, inter alia, that the presence of all five Tribunal members was sufficient and that the non-signature of one member did not invalidate the order.

In the writ appeal, the appellants contended that the Tribunal’s order was invalid because one member who had heard the matter had not signed it, contrary to Rule 17(8) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Rules, 1974.

Whether an order of a multi-member Land Tribunal is legally valid when it is not signed by one of the members who heard the case, despite the presence of the prescribed quorum?

Whether the learned Single Judge erred in upholding the Land Tribunal’s order on the ground that the presence of all members at the hearing and pronouncement was sufficient compliance with Rule 17(8)?

The Court applied Rule 16 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Rules, 1974, which prescribes a quorum of three members, including the Chairman, for a Tribunal meeting.

It separately applied Rule 17(8), which mandates that an order be signed by the Chairman and all other members of the Tribunal who heard the case; the Court treated this as a mandatory procedural requirement distinct from the quorum requirement.

Rule 17(9), requiring Tribunal orders to be speaking orders, was also noted.

Relying principally on Vijaya Bank Founders Branch v. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department, ILR 2008 KAR 1481, the Court held that failure of all adjudicating members to sign the order is not a mere technical defect but goes to the root of the adjudication and renders the order a nullity.

The Court also relied on Vishwanath v. State of Karnataka, W.P. No. 46938 of 2004, and Pundalik S/o Dattatraya Havaldhar v. State of Karnataka, W.P. No. 12383 of 2007, which treated non-compliance with Rule 17(8) as requiring the Tribunal’s order to be set aside.

The Tribunal’s order dated 30 January 2013 showed that the Chairman and three members had signed it, but Member No. 1, Sri Chandru Iliger, whose name appeared in the order as a member of the Tribunal, had not signed.

The Court distinguished the existence of quorum under Rule 16 from the obligation under Rule 17(8) to obtain the signatures of all members who heard the matter.

Thus, even if the Tribunal was competent to conduct the proceedings because the quorum was present, the final adjudication was incomplete and legally defective unless every member who heard the case signed the order.

Applying the binding principle in Vijaya Bank Founders Branch, the Court held that the omission affected the validity of the adjudication itself and was not curable as a technical lapse.

The learned Single Judge’s reasoning that a member might have been absent when the order was pronounced, and that mere non-signature therefore did not invalidate the order, was rejected because Rule 17(8) expressly requires the signatures of all members who heard the case.

Since the defect was dispositive, the Court did not examine the appellants’ remaining objections concerning possession, mutation entries, merits of the tenancy claims, or the Tribunal’s reasons.

The writ appeal was allowed; the learned Single Judge’s order dated 23 November 2022 was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the Land Tribunal for fresh determination in accordance with law, after considering all contentions of the parties.

The Tribunal was directed to dispose of the matter expeditiously, within six months from the date of its constitution.