A lawyer’s prior representation does not impute confidential knowledge to a subsequent client.

The petitioner, Defendant No. 6 in a suit for declaration and recovery of possession, challenged the Trial Court’s order dated 14.02.2026 rejecting his application under the procedural law governing amendment of pleadings.

The proposed amendment sought to plead that Defendant No. 6 had not been a party to an earlier suit, despite his name appearing as a party in parts of that suit’s record, allegedly due to an error or manipulation in the record.

The earlier suit did not contain any order impleading Defendant No. 6, and the plaintiff admitted during cross-examination that Defendant No. 6 had not been a party to that proceeding.

The amendment application was filed after closure of the plaintiff’s evidence, as the defendant claimed that he had been attempting to obtain certified copies of the earlier suit’s record.

The Trial Court rejected the application principally on the ground that the petitioner’s counsel had represented other parties in proceedings arising from the earlier suit and must therefore have known the relevant facts.

The plaintiff also acknowledged that there was an error in the earlier suit’s record and had filed an application under Section 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for correction, which remained pending.

Whether the Trial Court was justified in rejecting the application for amendment of the written statement on the ground that the petitioner’s counsel had represented other parties in proceedings arising from the earlier suit and therefore must have had knowledge of the proposed facts?

Whether the petitioner should be permitted to amend the written statement to plead that Defendant No. 6 was not a party to the earlier suit, particularly when the plaintiff admitted that fact and acknowledged an error in the earlier suit’s record?

If the amendment was allowed after closure of the plaintiff’s evidence, what conditions should govern any recall of the plaintiff’s witnesses?

The Court applied the principles governing amendment of pleadings, namely that an amendment should be permitted when it is necessary for determining the real controversy between the parties and for enabling the defendant to place a material defence on record, subject to considerations arising from the stage of the proceedings.

The Court also applied the principle that a lawyer’s professional confidentiality to a former or existing client cannot be breached by requiring disclosure of that client’s confidential information to another litigant merely because the lawyer represents that litigant in subsequent proceedings.

Section 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, was referred to in relation to the plaintiff’s pending application for correction of the earlier suit’s record, although no separate adjudication under that provision was made in the present petition.

No judicial precedent was cited in the order.

The High Court held that the Trial Court’s reasoning was untenable because the petitioner’s counsel could not be expected to disclose confidential information obtained while representing other parties in proceedings connected with the earlier suit.

The proposed amendment concerned a material fact directly relevant to whether the decree in the earlier suit could bind Defendant No. 6.

Its relevance was reinforced by the plaintiff’s admission that Defendant No. 6 had not been a party to the earlier suit and by the plaintiff’s own acknowledgment that the earlier record contained an error.

Although the amendment was sought after closure of the plaintiff’s evidence, the Court accepted that the petitioner could not reasonably have filed it earlier because he had been attempting to obtain certified copies of the relevant record.

Since the various proposed amendments substantially repeated the same assertion, the Court limited the relief to proposed paragraphs 4A(F) and 4A(G).

To prevent prejudice caused by the late amendment, the Court directed that any recall of a plaintiff’s witness would be permitted only if the petitioner deposited in advance the witness’s travel and stay expenses, including expenses associated with the witness’s residence in a foreign country.

The High Court set aside the Trial Court’s refusal to permit amendment to the limited extent necessary to allow insertion of paragraphs 4A(F) and 4A(G) in Defendant No. 6’s written statement, enabling him to plead and lead evidence that he was not a party to the earlier suit.

Any application to recall a plaintiff’s witness was made conditional upon advance payment by the petitioner of the witness’s travel and stay expenses; failure to deposit those expenses would bar such recall.

In view of the suit’s pendency since 2005, the Trial Court was requested to endeavour to decide it within eight months from receipt of the certified copy of the order.

The petition was accordingly disposed of.