A Lecturer Cannot Claim Appointment as Principal-in-Charge as a Matter of Right Under Advisory Guidelines

The appellant, a Lecturer serving as In-charge Principal of Government Higher Secondary School, Balaudi, challenged the appointment of respondent No. 7, Ramesh Kumar Lahre, as Principal-in-Charge of the institution.

The appellant had remained on medical leave from 19.09.2025 to 24.09.2025 and again from 06.10.2025 to 22.11.2025. During his absence, respondent No. 7 was permitted to function as Principal-in-Charge to ensure the smooth functioning of the school.

The appellant relied on an advisory dated 27.12.2016, stating that the senior-most Lecturer should function as Principal-in-Charge in the absence of a regular Principal.

The learned Single Judge dismissed the appellant’s writ petition, WPS No. 5712 of 2026, principally on the ground of delay, as the challenged order dated 28.10.2025 had been questioned only in July 2026.

Whether the learned Single Judge erred in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay without examining the challenge to the appointment of respondent No. 7 on merits?

Whether the appellant had an enforceable right to function as Principal-in-Charge on the basis of the advisory dated 27.12.2016, allegedly requiring the senior-most Lecturer to hold that position?

Whether the arrangement permitting respondent No. 7 to function as Principal-in-Charge during the appellant’s medical leave was legally unsustainable?

The Court applied the principle that discretionary writ jurisdiction may be declined where a petitioner approaches the Court after an unexplained and inordinate delay.

It further held that an advisory or guideline does not create an enforceable legal right where it is non-binding in nature; the advisory dated 27.12.2016 concerning appointment of a senior-most Lecturer as Principal-in-Charge could not, by itself, confer an absolute right upon the appellant.

The Court also recognised the administrative authority’s power to make an interim arrangement for the smooth functioning of an institution when the existing In-charge Principal is on leave.

No statutory provision or judicial precedent was expressly relied upon in the judgment.

The Court found that the appellant had been absent on medical leave for material periods while holding the position of Principal-in-Charge. Consequently, permitting respondent No. 7 to discharge those functions was treated as an administrative arrangement made to ensure continuity of the school’s functioning, rather than as an illegal deprivation of a vested right.

The Court also held that Annexure P/7 was merely advisory and non-binding, and that the complete guidelines had not been placed on record; therefore, the appellant could not claim appointment as Principal-in-Charge as a matter of right.

In addition, the appellant had challenged the order dated 28.10.2025 only in July 2026 without furnishing a satisfactory explanation for the delay. The Division Bench therefore found no error in the Single Judge’s refusal to exercise writ jurisdiction.

The Court further upheld the dismissal of the writ petition on the ground of delay and found no reason to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge.

Accordingly, the writ appeal was dismissed as devoid of merit.