A manpower outsourcing contract terminable on three months’ notice is not enforceable in perpetuity.

The appellant and M/s Object Technologies were awarded a manpower-supply contract by the Department of Technical Education under a 2018 work order.

The appellant contended that the arrangement continued until the Government filled the relevant vacancies and challenged the respondents’ decision to discontinue the contract, seeking its enforcement.

The Single Judge dismissed the petitions, holding that the contract had expired and was determinable.

In appeal, the Division Bench condoned a 114-day delay and considered whether the contract could be treated as continuing or specifically enforced.

The agreement provided for manpower supply until vacancies were filled, while clause 9 permitted termination on three months’ notice in specified circumstances and gave the appellant a corresponding right to stop providing services on notice.

Whether the agreement required the respondents to continue procuring manpower from the appellant until the vacancies were filled, or was instead a determinable contract terminable on three months’ notice.

Whether the Court should interfere under Article 226 with the notice discontinuing the contract, including in light of the parties’ dispute over service charges.

The Court applied the terms of the tender, work order and agreement, particularly clause 1, which set out the tenderer’s manpower-supply obligations, and clause 9, which provided for termination on three months’ notice.

It held that the agreement did not impose a reciprocal obligation on the Government to continue sourcing manpower from the appellant, and that the termination mechanism made the contract determinable rather than perpetual.

The Court also treated the dispute over service charges as contractual and unsuitable for final adjudication in proceedings under Article 226.

No precedent or specific substantive statutory provision was relied on in the reasoning.

Clause 1 described the period during which the appellant was to provide manpower, but did not oblige the Government to obtain that manpower from the appellant until all vacancies were filled; the Government retained discretion over whether to use outsourced services.

Clause 9 reinforced that conclusion: its use of “similarly” indicated that the appellant and respondents each had a right to end the arrangement on three months’ notice, and the respondents’ right was not confined to the stated grounds concerning breach or unsatisfactory service.

The Court therefore upheld the finding that the contract was determinable.

It declined to resolve the parties’ competing claims about excess service charges in writ proceedings, leaving them to pursue remedies in accordance with law.

It found no basis to interfere with the discontinuance notice in these proceedings and dismissed the appeal.

The dismissal did not prevent the appellant from pursuing recovery of any amounts it claimed were outstanding; the parties’ rights and contentions on that issue were reserved.