A memorandum recording an already acted-upon family arrangement does not require registration.

The plaintiff sought partition of several family properties, including Schedule-D, which comprised the family residence.

The defendants relied on an unregistered family settlement deed dated 15 April 1988 (Ext. A), asserting that the plaintiff had relinquished his claim to Schedule-D in return for ₹65,000 and had thereafter lived separately

The trial court granted the plaintiff a 1/6th share in Schedule-B, C and D properties, finding that Ext. A did not establish relinquishment of his rights in Schedule-D

On appeal by defendant No. 1(a), the first appellate court denied the plaintiff a share in Schedule-D on the basis of the settlement deed

The plaintiff’s second appeal was admitted on the question whether Ext. A required compulsory registration

Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908 requires registration of a non-testamentary instrument that itself creates, declares, assigns, limits or extinguishes rights in immovable property; Section 17(1)(c) applies to instruments acknowledging payment or receipt of consideration on account of such creation or extinguishment

A family arrangement may be made orally, and a writing that merely records an arrangement already concluded—rather than itself effecting the arrangement or serving as the foundation of future rights—does not require compulsory registration.

The Court applied the Supreme Court’s decision in *Tek Bahadur Bhujil v. Debi Singh Bhujil*, AIR 1966 SC 292, which distinguishes such a memorandum from a document that itself brings about the rights in property

The Court found that the property described in Ext. A and Schedule-D was, despite minor differences in area, the same property

It read Ext. A’s recitals as indicating that the family members were already possessing and enjoying their respective shares, and that the plaintiff had been excluded from the Bhubaneswar family house under an arrangement already acted upon

The recital concerning ₹65,000 was treated as compensation for the plaintiff’s separate residence, not as evidence that the document itself effected a transfer or relinquishment of his rights

Applying *Tek Bahadur Bhujil*, the Court held that Ext. A was a record of the prior arrangement, not the instrument that first extinguished the plaintiff’s rights; compulsory registration under Section 17(1)(b) or (c) was therefore not attracted

It found no ground to interfere with the first appellate court’s decision denying the plaintiff a share in Schedule-D; the second appeal was dismissed without an order as to costs