A non-party may appeal a decree only with leave and proof of prejudice.

Manoj Tewari instituted Title Suit No. 241 of 2013 against the petitioner, who filed a counterclaim seeking recovery of possession.

The suit was dismissed for non-compliance with a court order, but the counterclaim proceeded and was decreed ex parte against the plaintiff, directing him to vacate and deliver the scheduled property.

A proforma defendant, who had unsuccessfully applied to be transposed as a plaintiff in the counterclaim, filed Title Appeal No. 60 of 2025.

The First Appellate Court condoned the delay in filing the appeal and stayed the counterclaim decree.

The petitioner challenged both orders in revision, contending that the appellant was not a party to the counterclaim, had obtained no leave to appeal, and had shown no prejudice from the decree.

Whether a person who was not a party to the counterclaim could appeal against its decree without obtaining leave of the appellate court or demonstrating that the decree prejudicially affected them.

Whether the First Appellate Court’s orders condoning delay and staying the decree could stand when the appellant had not established standing to appeal.

Sections 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provide for appeals from decrees, but do not themselves specify who may appeal.

A person who was not a party to the proceedings may appeal only with the appellate court’s leave and upon showing that they are bound by, aggrieved by, or otherwise prejudicially affected by the decree; a stranger cannot appeal without satisfying the court that they qualify as an aggrieved person.

The Court applied the Supreme Court’s decision in H. Anjanappa & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 1180–1181 of 2025, 2025 INSC 121, which restated this principle.

The Court also considered the trial court’s rejection of the appellant’s application under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC to be added to the counterclaim proceedings.

The counterclaim decree operated against the plaintiff in the suit and directed that person to deliver possession; it contained no order against the proforma defendant who filed the appeal.

The appellant had not been a party to the counterclaim, and the record did not show that the decree prejudiced him or that he had obtained leave to appeal.

The First Appellate Court’s reliance on the appellant’s alleged lack of notice was, in the High Court’s view, perverse because the trial court had considered and rejected his application to be added to the proceedings.

Applying H. Anjanappa, the Court concluded that the appellant had not established a basis to appeal; the orders condoning delay and staying the decree therefore could not stand.

It held that the appeal’s admission could not stand in the absence of leave from the First Appellate Court and dismissed Title Appeal No. 60 of 2025.

The civil revision was disposed of accordingly.