A one-application empanelment rule is not arbitrary merely because existing panelists may relinquish.

The petitioner challenged Clause A(C) of a DSLSA notice dated June 1, 2026, which allowed each candidate to apply for only one preferred panel and one DLSA and provided for summary rejection of multiple applications

He argued that the restriction was arbitrary, particularly because Clause A(D) required an advocate already empanelled elsewhere to relinquish one panel if selected under the notice.

The application process closed on June 17, 2026, and selection-related steps had begun in the three DLSAs.

The petitioner sought, among other relief, invalidation of Clause A(C) and reopening of the application process.

1. Whether Clause A(C), restricting candidates to one application for one panel and one DLSA, was arbitrary or otherwise unlawful, including in light of Clause A(D).

2. Whether the Court should grant relief after the application period had closed and the empanelment process had progressed.

The prescription of qualifications, eligibility conditions, and the procedure and criteria for selection primarily lies within the domain of the employer or authority conducting the selection. Judicial review of such decisions is limited; the Court does not sit in appeal over the authority’s choice of selection procedure and will interfere under Article 226 only where a condition is shown to suffer from patent illegality or manifest arbitrariness

A rule addressing an existing empanelment does not, by itself, create a right to submit multiple applications in a new selection process.

The Court found that Clauses A(C) and A(D) governed different circumstances and stages: Clause A(C) regulated the number of applications in the current process, while Clause A(D) addressed what a candidate already empanelled elsewhere must do upon selection.

The latter therefore did not undermine the former.

As Clause A(C) formed part of the selection procedure and applied uniformly, the petitioner had not established patent illegality or manifest arbitrariness warranting interference under Article 226.

The Court also noted that the application period had ended and that interviews, document verification, or scrutiny had commenced across the three DLSAs, leaving no effective relief to be granted at that stage.

It also found that, given the closure of applications and progress of the process, no effective relief could be awarded.

The writ petition was dismissed, and any pending applications were disposed of.