A permissive occupant cannot acquire title by adverse possession, regardless of possession duration.

Late Atma Ram Sehgal, father of the parties, was allotted property at Outram Lines, Kingsway Camp, Delhi.

After his death, all his legal heirs executed a registered Relinquishment Deed dated 8 August 1974 in favour of the respondent, Kasturi Lal Sehgal.

The Kingsway Camp property was thereafter surrendered, and Property No. 1042, Mukherjee Nagar, Delhi, was allotted to the respondent on leasehold basis through a Lease Deed dated 3 February 1977.

The respondent subsequently constructed the property and obtained a registered Conveyance Deed dated 30 September 1999 in his favour.

The appellant, the respondent’s brother, occupied the rear portion of the property with his family from around 1977.

The respondent claimed that the appellant was permitted to reside there gratuitously as a licensee.

After the appellant asserted ownership rights through a notice dated 2 June 2017, the respondent revoked the licence by reply dated 12 July 2017 and demanded possession and mesne profits.

The appellant denied the respondent’s exclusive ownership and contended that the Relinquishment Deed had been executed only to facilitate the allotment of the Mukherjee Nagar property, which continued to be jointly held for the family.

He also pleaded limitation, adverse possession, and forgery of certain documents.

The Trial Court framed issues concerning limitation, adverse possession, possession, damages and permanent injunction.

On the respondent’s application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, the Trial Court decreed possession on the basis of admissions and the registered Relinquishment Deed.

The appellant challenged that decree in the present appeal.

Whether the respondent was entitled to a decree for possession under Order XII Rule 6 CPC on the basis of clear and unequivocal admissions regarding the Relinquishment Deed, the respondent’s title and the appellant’s permissive occupation?

Whether the appellant had acquired ownership by adverse possession by reason of his long occupation and electricity and water connections?

Whether the respondent’s suit for possession was barred by limitation under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963?

Whether the commencement of evidence and framing of issues barred the Trial Court from granting judgment under Order XII Rule 6 CPC?

The Court applied Order XII Rule 6 CPC, which permits judgment at any stage of the proceedings where clear admissions justify a decree, and Section 96 CPC governing first appeals.

Under Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, a suit for possession based on title must be instituted within twelve years from the date on which the defendant’s possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff; permissive possession does not commence the limitation period.

A claim of adverse possession requires proof of possession that is nec vi, nec clam, nec precario—peaceful, open, continuous and hostile—and the claimant must establish the date, nature, knowledge, duration and uninterrupted character of such possession, as held in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India, (2004) 10 SCC 779.

The Court also relied on Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729, concerning acquisition of title after completion of the statutory period of adverse possession.

Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria, (2012) 5 SCC 370, which holds that a gratuitous or permissive occupant, caretaker or relative cannot acquire title merely through long possession.

The possession of an agent or permissive occupant is subordinate to that of the true owner, as recognised in Southern Roadways Ltd. v. S.M. Krishnan, (1989) 4 SCC 603, Puran Singh v. State of Punjab, (1975) 4 SCC 518, Mahabir Prasad Jain v. Ganga Singh, (1999) 8 SCC 274, and Anima Mallick v. Ajoy Kumar Roy, (2000) 4 SCC 119.

The Court held that the appellant admitted execution of the registered Relinquishment Deed, although he attempted to explain that it was executed merely to facilitate the subsequent allotment.

That explanation could not override the operative contents of the registered deed, which vested the property rights in the respondent.

The respondent’s subsequent Conveyance Deed of 1999, also admittedly executed in his favour, further established his title.

The appellant had never instituted proceedings to challenge either instrument or seek partition, and his occupation as a brother permitted to reside in the property was consistent with permissive possession rather than ownership.

The appellant’s long possession and utility connections did not establish hostile, open and continuous possession under a claim of right.

His own case showed that he had entered and remained in possession with the respondent’s permission.

Such possession could not become adverse merely by the passage of time.

Consequently, the limitation period under Article 65 had not commenced until the licence was revoked on 12 July 2017, making the suit filed in 2020 timely.

The Court further held that Order XII Rule 6 CPC contains no restriction as to the stage at which an application may be filed.

The fact that issues had been framed and evidence had commenced did not prevent a judgment on admissions where the material admissions were clear and sufficient.

The Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decree for possession in favour of the respondent, holding that the respondent had established title through the registered Relinquishment Deed and Conveyance Deed, that the appellant was a permissive occupant whose licence had been validly revoked, that no title by adverse possession had been acquired, and that the suit was not barred by limitation.

All pending applications were also dismissed.