A person in a position of active confidence bears the burden of proving a transaction’s good faith.

Ram Sarup alleged that his daughter Rani procured a registered sale deed dated 8 March 2006 by representing it as a Will, although he intended to divide his property equally among his five daughters.

He was illiterate, had weak eyesight, and had lived with Rani, who was in a position to influence him.

The deed recorded consideration of ₹1 lakh, which Rani claimed to have paid in cash but did not substantiate with cogent evidence.

Ram Sarup sued for cancellation of the deed and recovery of possession; the Civil Judge decreed the suit, and the First Appellate Court affirmed that decision.

Rani’s second appeal challenged, among other things, the allocation of the burden of proof and the concurrent findings of fraud and undue influence.

1. Whether the First Appellate Court erred in placing on Rani the burden of establishing that the registered sale deed was not procured by fraud or undue influence, thereby requiring her to prove a negative.

2. Whether the concurrent findings that the sale deed was procured by fraud and undue influence warranted interference in the second appeal.

Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 places the initial burden of proof on the party asserting a fact.

Section 111 provides that, where the good faith of a transaction is in question between parties and one stands to the other in a position of active confidence, the burden of proving good faith lies on the party in that position.

In a second appeal under Section 100 read with Order XLII of the CPC, concurrent findings of fact are not to be disturbed absent a basis for interference; the Court treated the findings on fraud and undue influence as factual findings.

No precedent was cited in the judgment.

The Court found that Ram Sarup was illiterate and unfamiliar with English, while the sale deed was written in English; Rani lived with him and was positioned to exercise influence.

Rani’s admission that her father had no intention to sell, her failure to establish payment of the stated consideration, and the circumstances surrounding the deed supported the finding that he had not understood or freely consented to a sale.

The Court held that Section 111 applied given the relationship of active confidence.

It also clarified that, once both parties had led evidence, the case had to be decided on the evidence as a whole, and the question of onus lost significance.

The two lower courts’ conclusions were therefore factual findings that did not merit interference.

The cancellation of the sale deed dated 8 March 2006 and the direction to deliver peaceful, vacant possession to the plaintiffs were left undisturbed.