A PFA prosecution cannot stand without a valid sanction from a competent authority.

On 15 December 1994, a Food Inspector collected a sample of “Jitu Lollypop Candy” from the respondent’s shop.

The Public Analyst detected prohibited food colour and reported the product as misbranded.

After obtaining consent under Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (PFA Act), the Food Inspector filed a complaint alleging offences under Sections 7(1) and 16(1)(a)(i)(ii).

The Magistrate acquitted the respondent, finding that the prosecution had not proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt.

The State appealed against the acquittal.

Whether the Trial Court committed an error of fact or law in acquitting the respondent

Whether the sanction to prosecute under Section 20 of the PFA Act was legally valid, including whether the sanctioning authority was competent to grant it

Whether the acquittal was perverse or otherwise warranted appellate interference

Section 20 of the PFA Act requires written consent from the Central or State Government, or a person authorised by either, before prosecution is instituted; a prosecution lacking valid consent cannot be sustained.

The court relied on State of Gujarat v. Prajapati Amratlal Natvarlal, 2008 (1) GLR 765, and Ganpatbhai T. Prajapati v. Food Inspector, 2005 (3) GLH 389, for the principle that consent must be granted by a competent authority after due application of mind; a mechanical or legally unauthorised sanction is invalid.

On appeals against acquittal, Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, and the other cited Supreme Court authorities recognise the appellate court’s power to review the evidence, while requiring due regard to the reinforced presumption of innocence; where two reasonable views are possible, the acquittal should not be disturbed.

The sanction order showed that Shri J. D. Naykar, Assistant Commissioner, held additional charge as Deputy Commissioner (Food) and Local Health Authority subject to State Government approval, but no evidence of that approval was produced.

The prosecution therefore failed to establish his authority to grant consent under Section 20, leaving the mandatory requirement of valid sanction unmet.

Applying the principles governing appeals against acquittal, the Court found no infirmity, illegality or perversity in the Trial Court’s decision and concluded that the evidence did not establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt.

The State’s appeal was dismissed, the Trial Court’s acquittal was confirmed, the bail bond was cancelled, and the record and proceedings were ordered returned to the Trial Court.