A plausible acquittal cannot be disturbed absent perversity in the trial court’s appreciation of evidence.

The prosecution alleged that Dewanand, a vehicle driver, left for Siudi on 29 October 2011 and was later found dead near the Water Park at Hawai Adda Road.

His wife’s fardbeyan led to a case against unknown persons under Sections 302 and 201 IPC; the respondents were subsequently charged under Sections 302, 201 and 120B IPC in two sessions trials.

The trial court acquitted all four respondents.

The State appealed, contending that the evidence had been wrongly assessed; the respondents maintained that the acquittal was justified in a case based entirely on circumstantial evidence.

The High Court first condoned the 72-day delay in filing the appeal.

Whether the trial court’s acquittal was perverse or otherwise liable to interference in an appeal against acquittal.

Whether the prosecution evidence proved the respondents’ involvement in the offences under Sections 302, 201 and 120B IPC beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court applied the principles governing appeals against acquittal, relying on Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 3 SCC 544, and State of Odisha v. Banabihari Mohapatra, (2021) 15 SCC 268.

An appellate court may reappreciate evidence, but should not reverse an acquittal merely because another view is possible; interference is warranted where the trial court’s view is illegal or perverse, while a reasonably possible view favouring the accused must be maintained.

The prosecution was required to establish the charged offences under Sections 302, 201 and 120B IPC beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court also considered Sections 25, 26 and 27 of the Evidence Act in assessing the accused persons’ confessional statements.

The Court found no eyewitness or evidence that any respondent was last seen with the deceased.

The FIR and the witnesses’ earlier statements did not identify the accused, whereas some related witnesses made allegations against them in court; the Court considered those witnesses unreliable.

It also found that the confessional statements were inconsistent and improbable and could not be relied on under Section 27, being hit by Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act.

The medical evidence did not corroborate the prosecution account, and the investigation had not identified the passengers who had travelled with the deceased.

These deficiencies left reasonable doubt, and the trial court’s assessment was a possible view supported by the record.

The State’s acquittal appeal was dismissed; the 72-day delay had previously been condoned, and any pending interlocutory application was disposed of.